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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes important decisions
rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression and cases that significantly
affect earlier interpretations of North Dakota Law. The Review was writ-
ten by Shari Jo Levy and Sean M. Novak as a special project for the
North Dakota Law Review.
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AUTOMOBILE-LIVESTOCK OWNER LIABILITY
HASSAN V. BROOKS
In Hassan v. Brooks, I Carol Hassan appealed from a judgment that
denied her recovery for damages sustained when her car hit cattle stand-
ing on a highway. 2 Hassan was driving on a highway when her vehicle
hit cattle standing on the road. 3 She sued the cattle owner, Robert
Brooks, for injuries and damages sustained.4 Brooks counterclaimed for
the loss of his cattle. 5 Following denial of Hassan's motion for partial
summary judgment finding the owner strictly liable, a jury trial was
held.6 The court instructed the jury to apply the negligence standard of
care. 7 Neither party was found negligent. 8 Hassan appealed.9
Hassan argued that the trial court erred in applying the negligent
standard of care. 10 N.D.C.C. § 36-11-07(1) provides liability immunity
for a livestock owner when livestock damage a motor vehicle on a public
highway in a designated grazing area. I However, Hassan relied upon
N.D.C.C. § 36-11-07(3) which states, except as provided in subsections 1
and 2, the owner of cattle which damage "crops or other property" are
liable to persons sustaining injuries. 12 Since the damage to Hassan's car
occurred outside the grazing area, she argues Brooks should be strictly
liable.13
The court found the statute ambiguous and used extrinsic evidence
to interpret the legislative intent. 14 In Hennenfent v. Flath, a 1954 case,
the court held motor vehicles were not protected since the herd law was
intended to protect the cattle raising industry. 15 In 1961, the legislature
added a paragraph to N.D.C.C. § 36-11-07 which made livestock owners
completely immune from liability when their livestock damaged vehicles
in a designated grazing area. 16 The legislature did not amend any other
portion of the statute. 17 Nothing in the legislative history indicates that
the legislature intended to make livestock owners strictly liable for
damages to vehicles occurring outside a grazing area. 18 Therefore, after
1. 1997 N.D. 150, 566 N.W.2d 822.









I1. Id., 566 N.W.2d at 822-23.
12. Id., 566 N.W.2d at 823.
13. Id.
14. Id. 5.
15. Id. 1 6 (referring to Hennenfent v. Flath, 66 N.W.2d 533, 536 (N.D. 1954)).
16. Id. 7
17. Id.
18. Id., 566 N.W.2d at 824.
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reviewing statutory language, case law, and legislative history, the court
interpreted N.D.C.C. § 36-11-07 to apply a negligent standard for dam-




THOMPSON V. CITY OF WATFORD CITY
In Thompson v. City of Watford City,2 1 LeRoy Thompson, a former
city garbage collector, appealed a judgment dismissing his action against
Watford City for discriminatory employment practices. 22 Thompson
worked for the City as a garbage collector for nineteen years. 23 He was a
slow worker who did not collect his full share of the trash. 24 Coworkers
often became frustrated with Thompson and called him names.2 5 In
December of 1993, Thompson left work early after an argument
concerning his job performance.2 6 The Superintendent of Public Works
warned Thompson that walking off the job was unacceptable.27 Thomp-
son admitted that he intentionally worked slowly to make it last longer.28
In June of 1994, Thompson tried to hit a coworker twice. 29 Thompson
was instructed to go back to the shop to "cool off," but he walked off
the job and went fishing. 30 The next day, Thompson cleaned out his
locker, told his supervisor off, and walked off the job again. 31 The
Superintendent recommended termination of Thompson's employment
and the City Council voted to discharge him. 32
Thompson sued the City for refusing to make reasonable accom-
modations for him, and for wrongful discharge due to his mental dis-
ability. 33 The City denied any discrimination. 34 At trial, the court found
that Thompson was mentally disabled.35 However, the trial court did not
determine that the City fired Thompson for his disability. The court
19. Id.
20. Id. 9.
21. 1997 N.D. 172, 568 N.W.2d 736.




26. Id. 3, 568 N.W.2d at 736-37.








35. Id. 1 9.
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indicated that the City had used "legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for terminating [Thompson's] employment." 36 Thompson appealed. 37
On appeal, Thompson argued that the City discriminated against
him.38 He claimed that the City's refusal to make one or more accom-
modations created an impossible work environment for him and caused
his discharge. 39 The City argued that Thompson was discharged for
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons and that his mental disability did
not hinder his physical ability to work. 40 The City also argued that
Thompson was not entitled to any accommodations since he could
perform the work without them. 41
The North Dakota Human Rights Act prohibits employment dis-
crimination based on mental or physical disability.4 2 Discriminatory
practices include discharging an employee based solely on a mental or
physical disability, or an employer's failure to make reasonable accom-
modations for an otherwise qualified person with a mental or physical
disability.4 3 An "otherwise qualified person" is one "who is capable of
performing the essential functions of the particular employment in ques-
tion." 44 Since Thompson performed the essential physical functions of
his job for nineteen years, the Court found him otherwise qualified for
his work despite his mental disability.4 5
The Human Rights Act only generally describes what constitutes
an employer's failure or refusal to make accommodations for the dis-
ability of an otherwise qualified worker. 46 The Act does not detail what
accommodations an employer must make.4 7 The determination of the
reasonableness of accommodation is left to the fact finder.4 8 Thompson
contended he was a qualified person with a disability and that his
employer did not reasonably accommodate his disability.4 9 He did not
claim disparate treatment based on indirect evidence. 50 The McDonnell-
Douglas burden shifting test is unnecessary and inappropriate when an
employee's complaint against an employer is based solely on the
36. Id., 568 N.W.2d at 737-38.





42. Id. [ 13 (referring to N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (1997)).
43. Id. (referring to N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (1997)).
44. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(10) (1997)).
45. Id.
46. Id. 14, 568 N.W.2d at 739.
47. Id., 568 N.W.2d at 738-39.
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employer's failure to accommodate a person's.disability. 5 Therefore,
the Court did not use the McDonnell-Douglas framework in Thompson
and the burden of proof remained on the claimant, Thompson. 52
While the Human Rights Act requires employers to make reasonable
accommodations, the employee must request those accommodations and
the accommodations must be necessary for adequate job performance. 53
Thompson argued that the City should have made accommodations for
him. 54 However, there was no evidence that Thompson ever requested
specific accommodations from the City before his discharge.55 The
Human Rights Act imposes some limits on reasonable accommodations-
.56 Accommodations that threaten the health and safety of either the
disabled individual or others do not need to be made. 57 Recently, the
Seventh Circuit determined that an employee's violent behavior was an
exception to reasonable accommodations standard set forth in Palmer v.
Circuit Court of Cook County.58 While an employer has a statutory duty
to make a "reasonable accommodation," that duty does not favor em-
ployees who commit or threaten to commit violent acts. 59 Thompson
was not discharged for his mental disability, but for unacceptable job
behavior that included violence, as was the case in Palmer.60 The Court
found that the evidence supported the trial court's findings that
Thompson's job-related conduct gave the City legitimate and non-
discriminatory reasons to discharge him.6 1 Thus, the Court affirmed
the judgment dismissing Thompson's claim of employment discrimi-
nation. 62
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF PRIVACY
HoUGUM V. VALLEY MEMORIAL HOMES, ET AL.
In Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes,63 Daniel Hougum appealed
from a summary judgment issued by the district court. 64 Hougum





55. Id., 568 N.W.2d at 739-40.
56. Id. 17, 568 N.W.2d at 739.
57. Id.
58. Id. 20, 568 N.W.2d at 740 (referring to Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 117 F.3d
351, 352-53 (7th Cir. 1997)).




63. 1998 N.D. 24, 574 N.W.2d 812.
64. Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 1998 N.D. 24, 1, 574 N.W.2d 814, 814.
1998]
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termination. 65 Hougum also sued Sears Inc., and Shane Moran for intru-
sion upon seclusion. 66 On December 16, 1994, Shane Moran observed
Hougum masturbating in a men's public restroom at a Sears store. 67
Moran was employed as a loss protection officer at the store and was on
duty at the time he observed Hougum's activity.68
Moran had been using the stall next to Hougum, and had
inadvertently witnessed Hougum for approximately ten seconds through
a small hole located above the toilet paper dispenser in the stall. 69
Moran telephoned police to report what he had observed. 70 The police
came to the store and informed Moran that he could make a citizen's
arrest based on the conduct he had observed. 71 Moran filled out a citi-
zen's arrest form, and the police then entered the restroom and arrested
Hougum. 72
On December 20, 1994, Hougum pled guilty to a disorderly con-
duct charge. 73 Hougum's plea was reported in the Grand Forks Her-
ald. 74 Subsequently, Hougum's employer, VMH, learned of the Sears
incident. 75 Hougum was an ordained minister and had been hired by
VMH as a staff chaplain. 76 VMH had been concerned about the effect
the Sears incident would have on Hougum's relationship with VMH's
residents, and on January 19, 1995, they terminated his employment. 77
Hougum subsequently sued VMH for wrongful termination, breach of
contract, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.78
He also sued Moran and Sears for invasion of privacy and intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 79 The district court grant-
ed summary judgment on Hougum's actions and Hougum appealed to
the'North Dakota Supreme Court. 80
The first issue the court dealt with was Hougum's invasion of
privacy claim against Sears and Moran. 8 1 Although claims for invasion
of privacy have been recognized in virtually all jurisdictions, the court
65. Id. 916, 574 N.W.2d at 815.
66. Id. 9 1,574 N.W.2d at 814.
67. Id. 2 2 574 N.W.2d at 815.
68. Id. 9J 2-3.












81. See id. 99, 574 N.W.2d at 816.
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acknowledged that they had never decided whether such a claim exists in
North Dakota. 82 The court declined to use Hougum's case to decide
whether such a claim does exist because Hougum had failed to raise
disputed issues of fact to support such a claim. 83
Hougum had specifically claimed an action under the tort of intru-
sion upon seclusion.8 4 A claim for intrusion upon seclusion requires: 1)
an intentional intrusion by the defendant; 2) into a matter the plaintiff
has a right to keep private; and 3) which is objectionable to the reason-
able person.85 In analyzing the claim, a court looks at the means of
intrusion and the defendant's purpose for obtaining the information. 86
In the present case, the court found that Moran's intrusion on
Hougum was not intentional. 87 Additionally, the court stated that al-
though there is some right to privacy in a public restroom, that privacy is
not absolute. 88 Moran's visual intrusion had been limited in time and
scope, and the relatively brief intrusion was consistent with Moran's
duties as a loss protection officer concerned with preventing shop-
lifting.89 Since the case did not involve hidden surveillance devices to re-
cord private restroom matters, or represent an ongoing pattern of rest-
room observation, the court declined to elevate Moran's observations to
an invasion of privacy. 90 Therefore, the court concluded that summary
judgment had been proper on Hougum's invasion of privacy claim.9 1
The court then turned to Hougum's intentional and negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress claims against Sears and Moran. 92 The court
stated that North Dakota does recognize the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 93 If
a plaintiff can show: 1) proof of outrageous conduct; 2) that is inten-
tional or reckless; and 3) that causes severe emotional distress, then a
claim can exist. 94 However, in the present case, Hougum failed to show
that Moran and Sears' conduct was intentional, extreme, or outrageous. 95




85. Id. 14, 574 N.W.2d at 817 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1991)).
86. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 469, § 117).
87. Id. 9124, 574 N.W.2d at 818.
88. Id. 20.
89. Id. 9 23.
90. See id. 91 23, 24.
91. Id. 124.
92. Id. U 25, 28, 574 N.W.2d at 818-19.
93. See id. 26, 574 N.W.2d at 819 (citing Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 923-25 (N.D.
1989)); (RESTATEMENT, supra note 468, § 46).
94. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 468, § 46).
95. Id. 1 27.
1998] 573
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intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was justified.96 The
court also dismissed Hougum's negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim against Moran and Sears because Hougum failed to show bodily
harm. 97 Bodily harm is essential to sustain a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim. 98 The court found that Hougum's claimed de-
pression, shock, and embarrassment were merely transitory and did not
constitute "bodily harm." 99
The court then turned to Hougum's claim that VMH breached a
contractual obligation that they owed to Hougum.OO Although Hougum
did not have an actual contract with VMH, he maintained that he
received a "letter of call" informing him of his employment with VMH,
and he asserted that the letter constituted an employment contract.101
However, the "letter of call" Hougum received was issued by the Ameri-
can Lutheran Church, not VMH.102 The letter was determined to be an
invitation to Hougum to become a chaplain, and did not alter Hougum's
at-will employment status. 103 The court determined that the district court
had correctly dismissed Hougum's breach of contract claim against
VMH. 104
Although the court found that Hougum's other claims lacked merit,
the court did agree with Hougum's claim that VMH may have violated
his human rights. 105 While Hougum was an at-will employee with VMH,
the North Dakota Human Rights Act provides exceptions to protect em-
ployees in spite of the employment at-will doctrine. 106 One exception
states that an employer cannot discharge an employee based on the
employee's sex. 107 Hougum asserted that "sex" included sexual prefer-
ence, and that part of VMH's reason for firing Hougum was that they
believed he was a homosexual. 108 The court declined to consider
whether "sex" included sexual preference, because Hougum failed to




99. Id. 1 30.
100. See id. 31, 574 N.W.2d at 819-20.
101. Id. 1 32, 574 N.W.2d at 820.
102. Id.
103. Id. 1 33.
104. Id.
105. See id. 46, 574 N.W.2d at 822.
106. See id. 35, 574 N.W.2d at 820 (citing Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F.3d 1070, 1072
(8th Cir. 1995)).
107. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (1997)).
108. Id. 1 36. Hougum stated that he is not a homosexual, but VMH made the assumption that he
was and its conservative attitude would not tolerate employing homosexuals. Id.
[VOL. 74:567
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
a homosexual. 109 Therefore, Hougum failed to make a valid claim for
"sex" discrimination. 110
However, Hougum did make a convincing argument that he was dis-
charged for participating in "lawful activity off the employer's premises
during nonworking hours." I I An employer cannot discharge an em-
ployee for lawful conduct off-premises during nonworking hours that
does not directly conflict with the employer's business related inter-
ests. 112 The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent employers from
inquiring into an employee's conduct outside of work. 113 Hougum
argued that his conduct in the Sears restroom was not unlawful because
he withdrew his guilty plea and the charges were eventually dismissed.114
The court reasoned that Hougum's conduct was not unlawful be-
cause although North Dakota law prohibits masturbating in a public
place, 115 conduct in an enclosed stall in a public restroom is not general-
ly considered a public place. 116 In a criminal context, a public place is
defined as a place where the actor might reasonably expect the conduct
to be seen by others. 117 While the court would not hold as a matter of
law that Hougum's conduct was either lawful or unlawful, Hougum did
raise the possibility that his conduct was not prohibited by law.' 18 Since
a factual dispute existed as to whether Hougum's conduct was lawful,
and whether it related to VMH's business related interest, the court
reversed summary judgment on the claim.1 9 The court then remanded
the case for further proceedings.120
109. Id. [37.
110. Id.
111. Id. 1 38, 574 N.W.2d at 821 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03). The court agreed that
there were disputed factual issues concerning whether Hougum's off-premises activities had played a
role in VMH's decision to terminating Hougum. Id.
112. Id. 39 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03).
113. See id. 91 40. The North Dakota legislature wished to prevent discrimination based on an
employee's sexual orientation, marital status, weight, or smoking habits. Id.
114. Id. 42.
115. Id. 43 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12.1 (1997)).
116. Id. (citing Ward v. State, 636 SO.2d 68, 69 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994); Chubb v. State, 640 N.E.2d
44, 47 (Ind. 1994)).
117. Id. 1 44, 574 N.W.2d at 822 (citing United States v. Doe, 884 F. Supp. 78, 82 (E.D.N.Y
1995); State v. Whitaker, 793 P.2d 116, 118-20 (Ariz. 1990); Greene v. State. 381 S.E.2d 310, 311
(Ga. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Baus, 305 N.E.2d 592, 593 (111. Ct. App. 1973); Messina v. State, 130
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WEAPONS
KASPROWICZ V. FINCK
In Kasprowicz v. Finck,121 Darin Kasprowicz appealed a district
court judgment dismissing an appeal of his application to renew his con-
cealed weapons permit. 122 Kasprowicz's initial application for renewal
of his concealed weapons permit was returned by Sheriff Rodney Finck
because Kasprowicz failed to report that he had previously been arrested
on an ex parte warrant of attachment. 12 3 Kasprowicz subsequently
refiled his application, including the information concerning his arrest.
However, the Sheriff still recommended that the application be denied.124
The Sheriff reasoned that the application should be denied because
Kasprowicz had falsified a prior application, and had made threats
against public officials. 125 On two separate occasions, the Sheriff felt
that Kasprowicz had attempted to intimidate and threaten the Sheriff. 126
On the first occasion, the Sheriff had been invited to Kasprowicz's house
to discuss a legal dispute, and during the entire conversation Kasprowicz
kept a pistol that the Sheriff believed was loaded on the table.1 27 On the
second occasion, the Sheriff felt threatened when Kasprowicz indicated
that he was going to give the Sheriff nightmares. 128 The Sheriff believed
that based on his knowledge of Kasprowicz, the statements made could
be constituted as threats.129 Since the Sheriff recommended that Kaspro-
wicz's application be denied, the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI)
chief agent returned the application.130
Kasprowicz appealed the BCI chief's denial to the district court. 131
Kasprowicz sought re-instatement of his concealed weapons permit, and
damages for violation of his constitutional rights. 132 The district court
dismissed the BCI chief from the action, and then made specific findings
on the claim against the Sheriff.133 The district court found that Kaspro-
wicz had not made a false statement on his application, but also
determined that the Sheriff had not abused his discretion in refusing to
121. 1998 N.D. 4, 1, 574 N.W.2d 564, 564-65.




126. Id. J 4-5, 574 N.W.2d at 565-66.
127. Id. 4, 574 N.W.2d at 566.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. 2, 574 N.W.2d at 565.
131. Id. 3.
132. Id.
133. Id. U 3-5, 574 N.W.2d at 565-66.
576 [VOL. 74:567
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recommend Kasprowicz's application.1 34 Kasprowicz appealed the
court's decision to the North Dakota Supreme Court.13
5
The court began its review of the case by stating that an individual's
right to bear arms under the North Dakota Constitution is not abso-
lute.136 The individual's right is subject to reasonable regulation under
the state's police power.137 Using its power to regulate firearm posses-
sion the state has placed restrictions on persons convicted of certain
crimes, persons committed or diagnosed as mentally ill, and persons
under the age of eighteen.138
The court then looked at the proper procedure for issuing a license
to carry a concealed firearm or dangerous weapon in North Dakota.1
39
Section 62.1-04-03(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code states that it
is the job of the chief of the BCI to issue the license to carry a concealed
firearm or weapon. 140 As part of the application procedure, the appli-
cant must get written approval from the Sheriff of the county of the
applicant's residence. 141 The Sheriff may not give approval of the appli-
cation until a background investigation has been completed, and the
applicant has attended a testing procedure, which is not required for
renewal applications. 142
The court concluded that based on its review, the legislature did not
intend to give sheriffs the discretion to deny licenses for concealed fire-
arms or weapons. 143 Therefore, when the BCI chief treats an application
as incomplete without a sheriff's approval, the sheriff is impermissibly
being given the power to decide who may receive such a license.144 The
court stated that any discretion given to the county sheriff under North
Dakota Century Code § 62.1-04-03 is "symbolic at best."1 45 Giving
the sheriff, as a public official, the actual power to deny licenses would
raise serious constitutional questions. 146 Therefore, the court concluded
that the sheriff must approve an application within a reasonable period
after receipt, unless the applicant objectively fails to take the required
test. 147
134. Id. 5, 574 N.W.2d at 566.
135. Id. 1 1,574 N.W.2d at 565.
136. Id. 7, 574 N.W.2d at 566 (citing N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 1).
137. Id. (citing State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481, 483 (N.D. 1987)).
138. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-01(l)(1995)).
139. Id. 1 8 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03(1) (1995 & Supp. 1998)).
140. See id. (citing N.D. Cent Code § 62.1-04-03(1)).




145. Id. 11, 574 N.W.2d at 568.
146. Id. (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Hagemeister, 188 N.W.2d 405, 413 (N.D. 1971)).
147. Id.
57719981
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The sheriff may recommend that the BCI chief deny the applica-
tion, but the absence of the sheriff's approval cannot be used as the sole
basis for denying the application.148 The court then stated that a sheriff
must forward every application to the BCI chief, along with the results of
the background investigation. 149 Once the BCI chief has received the
application from the sheriff, the chief should exercise reasonable dis-
cretion in determining whether to approve or deny the application.1 50
While the legislature has not expressed how the BCI chief should exer-
cise the discretion given, the court concluded that there is a range of
reasonableness that will not be interfered with by the judiciary.151 In the
present case, the court found that by denying Kasprowicz's application
solely because it lacked the Sheriff's approval, the BCI chief had not
exercised any discretion. 152 The court then reversed the district court's
decision and remanded the matter, holding the action in abeyance until
the BCI chief received Kasprowicz's application and exercised his
discretion in making a determination.1 53
CONTRACT LAW-UNILATERAL CONTRACTS-OPEN RECORDS LAW
ADAMS COUNTY RECORD V. GREATER NORTH DAKOTA ASSOCIATION
In Adams County Record v. Greater North Dakota Association
[hereinafter Adams County Record If],154 the plaintiffs, newspapers and a
state representative [collectively Adams County Record], sought a writ of
mandamus to compel the defendant, Greater North Dakota Association
[GNDA] to makes its records available under the North Dakota open
records law.155 Adams County Record requested that the district court
issue a writ of mandamus ordering GNDA to provide them access to
GNDA's records. 156 Adams County Record argued that GNDA is an
organization supported, at least in part, by public funds and that GNDA
is subject to North Dakota's open records laws.157 The trial court grant-
ed summary judgment and denied the writ of mandamus, 158 and Adams
County Record appealed.159
148. See id. 11-12.
149. Id. 13.
150. Id. 14, 574 N.W.2d at 568-69.
151. Id., 574 N.W.2d at 569 (citing Cass County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Northern States Power Co.,
518 N.W.2d 216, 220 (N.D. 1994)).
152. Id.
153. Id. 15.
154. 1997 N.D. 116, 564 N.W.2d 304.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment
in Adams County Record v. GNDA, 529 N.W.2d 830, 835-38 (N.D.
1995) [hereinafter Adams County Record I].160 In 1995, the Court
explained:
[T]he term support, as used in the open records law, means
something other than an exchange of money for identifiable
and specific goods and services. When there is a bargained-for
exchange of value, a quid pro quo, the entity is not supported
by public funds. As such, those agencies or organizations
carrying out business with the state ... are not subjected to the
open records law.161
The Court explained that the trial court needed to address these issues in
connection with a $60,000 grant provided by the Tourism Department to
GNDA to help publish Horizons magazine.16 2 The trial court was to
determine whether GNDA is supported by public funds and is subject to
the open records law. 163
The trial court determined there was a contract between the Tourism
Department and GNDA for the publication of Horizons magazine.1 64
However, this contract did not contain mutuality of obligation.165 If
GNDA did not accept the money, then the state could not force GNDA
to publish the magazine.166 The trial court further analyzed the relation-
ship between the Tourism Department and GNDA and found that the
state received quid pro quo for their contributions. 167 The trial court
denied the writ and Adams County Record appealed.168
In the 1997 appeal, Adams County Record argued that the district
court's analysis should have determined that no contract existed since
there was no mutuality of obligation. 169 The court disagreed and held
that there was a unilateral contract.170 A binding contract exists where
one party makes a conditional promise based upon another's per-
formance and the other party performs. 171 An offeree's performance,
160. Id. 3, 564 N.W.2d at 305.
161. Id. 1 3 (quoting Adams County Record v. Greater North Dakota Ass'n, 529 N.W.2d 830,
835-38 (N.D. 1995)).
162. Id. (describing Adams County Record, 529 N.W.2d at 835-38).
163. Id. (describing the holding in Adams County Record, 529 N.W.2d at 835-38).
164. Id. 4 (describing the holding in Adamus County Record, 529 N.W.2d at 835-38).
165. Id. (describing the holding in Adanis County Record, 529 N.W.2d at 835-38).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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rather than a mutual performance, can create a binding contract. 172
When a party seeks a performance rather than a return promise, a
unilateral contract is formed. 173 Mutuality of obligation is not necessary
to form a binding unilateral contract. 174
Although there was no mutuality of obligation between GNDA and
the state, there was a unilateral contract. 175 GNDA accepted the state's
unilateral offer when it published Horizons magazine. 176 The state re-
ceived benefits when GNDA published the magazine. 177 GNDA is then
entitled to the promised monetary consideration. 178 Each party received
the bargained for consideration and therefore, a quid pro quo exists. 179
As such, the state received "substantial benefits" from GNDA's publi-
cation of Horizons magazine, and the district court's denial of the writ of
mandamus was affirmed by the Court.180
CORPORATIONS LAW-SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY
JONES V. BILLINGS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1
In Jones v. Billings County School District # 1,181 the school district
appealed a district court ruling awarding summary judgment to Don
Jones and Ernest Missel, shareholders in F & J Construction, Inc. 182 The
district court found that Jones and Missel had no personal liability for
alleged negligence caused by their dissolved corporation in constructing
a school building for the school district. 183 The North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the district court, finding that if the school district prevails
in its action, Jones and Missel can be held liable to the extent of the value
of corporate assets distributed to them. 184
Don Jones and Ernest Missel were shareholders of F & J Construc-
tion, Inc. when the company contracted with the school district to build a
school.185 The school was completed in 1988, but in 1991 problems
developed with the school's roof.186 F & J worked with the school for
the next several years in an attempt to repair the problems with the
172. Id. 7.
173. Id. 8, 564 N.W.2d at 306-07.





179. Id. H 1, 12.
180. Id..
181. 1997 N.D. 173, 1, 568 N.W.2d 477,477.
182. Jones v. Billings County School Dist. # 1, 1997 N.D. 173, 1 1,568 N.W.2d 477, 477-78.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. 1 2, 568 N.W.2d at 478.
186. Id.
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roof.I87 Meanwhile, on April 28, 1993, F & J Construction, Inc. filed a
Statement of Intent to Dissolve by Consent of Shareholders with the Sec-
retary of State. 188 Subsequently, on February 4, 1994, F & J Construc-
tion filed Articles of Dissolution with the Secretary of State, and at that
point, the remaining assets of the corporation were distributed to Jones
and Missel. 189
Although the school district had been working with F & J Construc-
tion in an attempt to resolve construction defects in the school's roof, the
school district never received notice that the corporation had filed a
Statement of Intent to Dissolve. 190 On February 16, 1995, the District
filed suit against F & J Construction, the architect, and the roof manu-
facturer.191 Jones and Missel responded by bringing a declaratory judg-
ment action in order to obtain a determination that they had no personal
liability for the actions of the dissolved corporation.1 92
In deciding this case, the North Dakota Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a conflict between two provisions in the notice of dissolu-
tion statute. 193 Jones and Missel had properly dissolved their corpora-
tion in February of 1994, in accordance with Section 10-19.1- 110.1-
(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code, which allows a corporation to
file its articles of dissolution after payment of all known creditors and
claimants has been satisfied. 194 At the time of dissolution, the District
had not yet filed a claim against the corporation and was not a known
claimant. 195 Although the District had not filed against the corporation
prior to dissolution, the statute permits claims against corporations within
two years of the filing of the notice of intent to dissolve.' 96 Therefore,
although the corporation had been dissolved prior to the District's filing
of a claim, the court concluded that the statute clearly provided that the
District could maintain their claim because they had filed within the time
provided by subsection (3)(a).197
In support of its decision, the court cited other instances in North
Dakota law where the legislature may have provided for claims against a
dissolved corporation.198 As a result, the court concluded that the un-
187. Id.




192. Id. 116, 8, 568 N.W.2d at 478-79.
193. See id. 6 (referring to N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-110.1 (1997)).
194. Id.
195. See id. 8, 568 N.W.2d at 478-79.
196. Id. 6, 568 N.W.2d at 478; N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-110.1(3)(a) (1995).
197. Jones, 1997 ND 173, 8, 568 N.W.2d at 478-79.
198. See id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-129(4) (1995 & Supp. 1998) (providing for ser-
vice of process upon dissolved corporations); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-125 (1995) (permitting for
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ambiguous language of the statute permitted claims against dissolved
corporations, 99 and as such, the court stated that it was bound by the let-
ter of the statute. 200 The court also determined that permitting claimants
to have two years from the filing of notice of intention to dissolve would
be meaningless if shareholders could cut off the right by actually dis-
solving the corporation without notice to claimants. 20 1 The court stated
that provisions of a statute must be harmonized in order to give full
force and effect to every provision, and that objective is accomplished by
permitting claims against dissolved corporations within the two year
period. 202
After deciding that the District's action was not barred, the court
addressed the issue of the appropriate remedy for the District. 203 The
court rejected the defendants' argument that they had no personal
liability, and assets distributed to them couldn't be reached because the
District hadn't filed their claim within one year after the filing of the
Articles of Dissolution. 204 The court determined that the fact that claims
could be made against a corporation within the relevant two-year period,
but that assets distributed to shareholders couldn't be reached after one
year, would effectively create a right without a remedy. 205 Therefore, the
court concluded that the appropriate solution in this case was to impose
an implied trust on the corporate assets distributed to Jones and
Missel. 206
The implied trust was justified because the corporation in this case
had distributed all of its assets prior to expiration of the time for all
claims against the corporation to have been filed.207 Since the assets
were distributed early, Jones and Missel took the corporate assets subject
to a constructive trust in favor of the corporation's claimants. 208 The
court then remanded the case to the lower court. 209 The court stated that
if the District prevails in its suit against F & J Corporation, Jones and
Missel would be liable for the corporate assets received, or the value of
those assets if they have been disposed of by the shareholder. 210
mer directors, officers, or shareholders to assert or defend claims against the dissolved corporation).




203. Id. 13, 568 N.W.2d at 479-80.
204. See id. 13; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-124(2) (1995 & Supp. 1998) (requiring the
filing of a claim against corporate assets within one year of filing of articles of dissolution).
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CRIMINAL LAW-BAIL
STATE V. OWENS
In State v. Owens,2 11 Earl Owens appealed a district court's denial of
a motion for the return of his bond.212 In July 1995, Earl Owens was
arrested on a warrant. 213 Owens was released from custody after posting
a $500 bond. 214 On January 30, 1996, while Owens was in custody at the
county jail, Owens' wife Ann appeared at the clerk of court's office and
claimed the bond money. 2 15 Owens' wife presented the clerk with a
computer-generated piece of paper that served as a receipt in Burleigh
County. 2 16 On April 10, 1996, Owens was convicted and sentenced to
the state penitentiary. 217
One year later, Owens moved for the return of the $500 bond.2 18
Owens claimed that the clerk of district court had been mistaken in
giving Owens' wife the bond money because the bond had been reg-
istered in Owens' name. 2 19 The court denied Owens' motion, con-
cluding that when Ann Owens claimed the money, the bond had been
properly returned. 220 Owens appealed the court's order to the North
Dakota Supreme Court. 221
The first issue the court confronted involved whether the district
court's order can be appealed. 222 The court stated that if no right to
appeal exists then the court must dismiss.223 Since a criminal defendant
was involved in the case, the court determined that an appeal may be
made from any order after judgment that affects a substantial right of
the defendant. 224 The court stated that a substantial right constitutes
more than the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard. 225 The
court concluded that a substantial right could also involve the wrongful
paying out of valuable property deposited with the court. 226 Therefore,
211. 1997N.D. 212,11, 570 N.W.2d 217, 218.









221. Id. 91 4.
222. Id. 5.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-06 (1991)).
225. See id. 17, 570 N.W.2d at 218-19.
226. See id. 1 9, 10, 570 N.W.2d at 219 (citing Agricultural Bond & Credit Corp. v. Courtenay
Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 262 N.W. 453, 457 (N.D. 1935)).
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the court found that the district court's order is appealable because
Owens' property interest in the $500 bond, and his possible deprivation
of that property constituted a substantial right. 227
The next question for the court to decide involved whether the
district court erred in denying Owens' motion for return of the $500
bond.228 While the court had never addressed the standard of review for
an appeal from an order denying a motion on return of bond, the court
found that there existed a mixture of questions of law and fact that made
the matter fully reviewable by the court. 229 The court found that Owens
had presented a prima facie case entitling him to the return of his bond
money. 230 A bond is returned to a defendant when a defendant has been
exonerated. 231 Exoneration occurs when the condition of the bond has
been satisfied. 232 Owens demonstrated that the bond receipt showed
only his name, that he had paid the money himself, and that exoneration
of the bond was appropriate because his incarceration meant the bond
was no longer needed. 233 The state attempted to defend itself by
claiming that no statute requires return of the bond money only to the
person that posted the bond. 234 The court rejected the state's defense,
stating that N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-22-31 clearly applies when the
defendant has deposited the money for the bond.235 Since Owens
presented a prima facie case for return of the bond money, and the state
could not refute Owens' claim, the North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's order.236
CRIMINAL LAW-JURY INSTRUCTION
STATE v. GAGNON, III
In State v. Gagnon,237 William Gagnon III-appealed from a verdict
and judgment of conviction for murder.238 On March 29, 1996, Gagnon
and Philip Mclalwain left a bar at 1:00 a.m. 239 They walked backwards
across the parking lot and exchanged words with Kevin Geiser and
227. See id. I 11.
228. Id. 1 12, 570 N.W.2d at 219-20.
229. See id. 12, 13.
230. See id. 16, 570 N.W.2d at 220.
231. Id. 14 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-22-31 (1991)).
232. Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)).
233. See id. 16.
234. Id. 17.
235. Id.
236. Id. [ 19.
237. 1997 N.D. 153, 567 N.W.2d 807.
238. State v. Gagnon, 1997 N.D. 153, 1, 567 N.W.2d 807, 807.
239. Id. 2.
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Wayne Geiser. 240 A fight began which ended when Gagnon fatally
stabbed Kevin Geiser in the chest with a knife. 241 Gagnon was convicted
of class AA murder and received a life sentence. 242 Gagnon argued that
errors in jury instructions, errors in evidentiary rulings, and insufficient
of evidence to support his conviction justified a new trial.
243
The trial court gave the jury instructions on class AA murder and
manslaughter but did not give instructions on negligent homicide,
although Gagnon requested the instruction. 244 The trial court did not
give jury instructions on class A murder nor did Gagnon requested this
instruction. 245 Gagnon argued that the trial court erred in failing to give
jury instructions on negligent homicide. 246 When Gagnon requested an
instruction on negligent homicide, the State objected and the trial court
denied Gagnon's request. 247 The trial court agreed with the State that
"it's pretty hard to be negligent in self-defense." 248 However, in a
murder case, a negligent homicide instruction must be given when man-
slaughter and self-defense are issues. 249 The State contended it was a
mistake to instruct the jury on self-defense, and therefore, a negligent
homicide instruction was not necessary. 250
The Court reviewed the trial court's record and determined there
was sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on self-defense. 251
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a legal defense although
it may be weak or inconsistent on an evidentiary basis. 252 The evidence
should be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. 253 The
evidence presented at trial could suggest that Kevin Geiser and Wayne
Geiser were the aggressors, while Gagnon and Mclalwain were attempt-
ing to retreat, and that Gagnon believed his use of force was necessary to
protect himself. 254 Therefore, the jury instruction on self-defense was
appropriate. 255
240. Id. 2, 567 N.W.2d at 807-08.








249. Id. 7, 567 N.W.2d at 809.
250. Id.
251. Id. 10, 567 N.W.2d at 810.
252. Id. 9, 567 N.W.2d at 809-10 (referring to Closs v. Leapley, 18 F.3d 574, 580 (8th Cir.
1994)).
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Gagnon contended that the jury instruction concerning self-defense
was flawed. 256 The jury instruction on self-defense defined the reason-
ableness of the accused beliefs. 257 However, the instructions did not state
that "if the defendant committed the act in defense against the danger of
imminent bodily injury by the other person, his conduct in committing
the act was justified, and he should not be convicted." 258 The trial
court's instructions did not inform the jury that Gagnon's self-defense
conduct may have been justified. 259 The court held that the jury should
have received this instruction concerning self-defense. 260 The court con-
cluded that a self-defense instruction was warranted. 261 Consequently,
the jury should have been instructed on negligent homicide. 262 There-
fore, the court reversed the verdict and judgment of conviction. 263 The
matter was remanded for a new trial. 264
CRIMINAL LAW-OBSTRUCTING HIGHWAYS
STATE V. BROSSART
In State v. Brossart,265 Rodney Brossart was convicted of plowing a
section line. 266 Brossart appealed. Brossart admitted he regularly plowed
the unimproved section line between two sections of his farmland. 267 In
1996, someone complained to the Township Board that the section line
on Brossart's property was not open for travel. 268 The Township Board
created a memo which stated that roads must be maintained to a
minimum width and could not be cultivated during spring or harvest.
Owners were required to first obtain written permission from the town-
ship board before cultivating a road, and roads were not to be ob-
structed. 269 Brossart continued to plow and seed his section line, without
written permission, after he received the memo. 270
The State criminally charged Brossart with Obstructing Highways in
violation of N.D.C.C. § 24-12-02 which states no person may:
256. Id. 111.
257. Id.





263. Id. 14, 567 N.W.2d at 811.
264. Id.
265. 1997 N.D. 119, 565 N.W.2d 752.
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1. Obstruct any public highway in any manner with intent to
prevent the free use thereof by the public;
2. Willfully and knowingly obstruct or plow up, or cause to
be obstructed or plowed up, any public highway or right
of way, except by order of the officials having jurisdiction
over such highway for the purpose of working or
improving the same; ... or
4. Plow up a section line in a manner so as to obstruct usual
traffic on the section line. 27 1
While Brossart admitted that he had plowed the section line, he in-
sisted that he never prevented travel on it.272 He moved for an acquittal
arguing plowing a section line is not illegal if no actual obstruction
resulted. 273 The court denied his motion. 2 74 Brossart asked the trial
court to instruct the jury on the entire statute and the trial court re-
fused.275 The trial court only instructed on subsection 2.276 The jury
found him guilty. 277 Brossart appealed. 2 7 8
On appeal, Brossart argued that N.D.C.C. § 24-12-02(2) permits
plowing when it does not obstruct usual travel. 279 The court examined
the statute and found it ambiguous when read in its entirety since
subsection 2 could not be reconciled with subsection 4.280 The North
Dakota Supreme Court found the statute unclear concerning whether a
farmer must first get permission from a local official before plowing a
section line even when that plowing would not obstruct travel. 2 8 1
Therefore, the court determined legislative intent concerning N.D.C.C. §
24-12-02 by using extrinsic aids since the statute was ambiguous. 282
The court first referred to State v. Silseth,283 which involved a
farmer convicted of violating Obstructing Highways when he plowed a
section line. 284 The farmer argued the section line was not regularly
traveled. 285 While a majority of the court rejected this argument, there
271. Id. 4, 565 N.W.2d at 753-54.







279. Id. [ 9.
280. Id. 15.
281. Id. 17.
282. Id. 14, 565 N.W.2d at 755-56.
283. 99 N.W.2d 868 (N.D. 1987), superseded by statute, State v. Brossart, 1997 N.D. 119; 565
N.W.2d 752.
284. State v. Brossart, 1997 N.D. 119, 10, 565 N.W.2d at 752, 754.
285. Id.
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was a strong dissent.28 6 The dissenters reasoned that the "Legislature
only intended to punish plowing that impeded usual travel on a section
line and had not meant to prevent plowing that improved travel." 287
One of the dissenting justices, Justice Gierke, added that he hoped the
Legislature would amend the statute to overcome the effect of the
majority's holding in Silseth.288
In response to Silseth, the 1987 Legislature amended N.D.C.C. §
24-12-02 and added subsection 4.289 However, the Legislature did not
clarify whether the limitation in subsection 2, "except by order of the
officials having jurisdiction," applied to the new subsection 4.290 The
House Minutes from April 17, 1987, discuss the proposed change to the
statute. 29 1 Representative Kretscher stated that "subsection 4 would
allow the plowing on a section line if . . . it doesn't obstruct-the usual
travel." 292  After considering the legislative discussion and that the
subsection was added in response to Silseth, the Court agreed that the
purpose of this statute is to permit plowing of unimproved section lines
when the plowing does not interfere with the usual travel. 293
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Brossart did not vio-
late Obstructing Highways by simply plowing his section line.294 How-
ever, that conclusion did not wholly acquit Brossart. 295 Jury instructions
were incorrect and should not have referred to subsection 2 but to
subsection 4.296 There was some evidence at trial that Brossart parked
machinery on the section line and obstructed travel. 297 The jury may
have convicted Brossart under N.D.C.C. § 24-12-02(4) in determining
that he obstructed travel in other ways that his plowing. 298 Therefore, the
Court reversed Brossart's conviction and remanded for a new jury trial
with correct jury instructions. 299
CRIMINAL LAW-PLEA AGREEMENT
OSTAFIN V. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
286. Id. 10, 11, 565 N.W.2d at 754-55.
287. Id. 11, 565 N.W.2d at 755.
288. Id.
289. Id. 112.
290. Id. 17, 565 N.W.2d at 756.
291. Id. 21, 565 N.W.2d at 757.
292. Id.
293. Id. [22.





299. Id. 30, 565 N.W.2d at 759.
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In Ostafin v. State of North Dakota,300 the State appealed an order
granting Shawn Ostafin's motion to correct his sentence since his waiver
of any "good time" earned was illegal. 30 1 On November 8, 1991,
Shawn Ostafin pled guilty to the murders of his father and step-mother,
both class AA felonies. 302 Following a plea agreement, Ostafin was sen-
tenced to serve two concurrent seventeen year sentences at the state
penitentiary and he waived any reduction in sentence for "good time"
earned pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 12-54.1-01.303
On March 28, 1996, Ostafin filed a motion to correct an illegal sen-
tence with the district court. 304 The State resisted Ostafin's motion and a
hearing was held on August 25, 1996.305 Ostafin argued that the North
Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State v. Trieb3O6 was controlling.
As such, Ostafin's waiver of good time credits rendered his 1991 plea
agreement illegal which resulted in an illegal sentence. 307 The trial court
agreed with Ostafin and gave him two choices: 1) to withdraw his guilty
plea and stand trial; or 2) to continue the guilty plea and allow the judge
to correct the sentence. 308 Ostafin chose to withdraw his guilty plea. 309
The State appealed the court's order. 3 10
First, the State argued that Ostafin could not withdraw his plea of
guilty since his motion only requested a correction of his sentence. 3 11
The Court was unpersuaded by this argument and used this opportunity
to clarify their decisions in State v. Trieb and Trieb 11.312 In Trieb H, the
court held that the defendant's sentences were illegal because a
defendant cannot waive good time credits. 313 Good time credits are a
statutory right according to N.D.C.C. § 31-11-05(4).314 The legislative
purpose of good time credit is to encourage good conduct of
prisoners. 315 Therefore, the waiver of the statutory right of good time
credits would violate public policy. 3 16 Although the State urged the
Court to overrule Trieb 11, the State did not present any arguments not
300. 1997 N.D. 102, 564 N.W.2d 616.
301. Ostafin v. State, 1997 N.D. 102, 1,564 N.W.2d 616, 616.




306. 516 N.W.2d 287 (N.D. 1994).
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already presented and decided in Trieb H1.317 Thus, the Court was not
persuaded, and it affirmed its decision in Trieb 11.318
Next, the State argued that Ostafin's sentence differed from the
illegal sentence given in Trieb 11.319 Ostafin's sentence is distinguishable
from Trieb's sentence because it did not approach the threshold of a
potential life sentence nor did it prohibit eligibility for parole. 320 The
State argued Trieb II was not applicable because of these differences.321
The Court disagreed with the State and found that Ostafin's sentence was
illegal under Trieb II, not based upon the specific length of the sentence,
but based upon the waiver of a good time reduction in Ostafin's
sentence by plea agreement. 322 A prisoner must "earn" the monthly
reductions in sentence by good conduct. 323 North Dakota Century Code
section 12-54.1-01 "does not authorize a prisoner to automatically
'earn good time' by entering into a plea agreement." 324 Therefore, the
Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the sentence in Ostafin was
illegal. 325
Finally, the State successfully argued that the trial court had the
discretion to amend the sentence to correct it so as to maintain the intent
of the original plea bargain. 326 In Trieb III, "the resentencing of Trieb
to thirty years with the allowance of good time maintain[ed] the intent of
the original plea bargain." 327 At the original sentencing hearing in
Trieb, the trial court clarified that the sentence of twenty-two years
without possibility of good time equaled the thirty year requirement of
the statute. 328 Consequently, in Trieb III, the court's amended sentence
clearly reflected the intent of the original plea agreement. 329
In Trieb III, the court followed Rule 35(a), N.D. R. Crim. P., hold-
ing that a sentencing court may correct an illegal sentence at any time
and can do so even if the correction results in a harsher sentence. 330
Ostafin asked for a correction of his sentence. 331 Ostafin did not request
317. Id. 16.
318. Id. 6.











330. Id. 1 12, 564 N.W.2d at 619.
331. Id. 13.
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to withdraw his plea of guilty. 332 Therefore, the court held that when a
defendant brings a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule
35(a), N.D. R. Crim. P., the sentencing court should first determine
whether the illegal sentence can be corrected so as to preserve the intent
of the original plea agreement and give the defendant what he bargained
for in the original plea agreement. 333 The court remanded Ostafin to the
sentencing court to determine whether the illegal sentence could be
corrected to reflect the intent of the plea agreement. 334 If the sentence
could be corrected, Ostafin should be resentenced following Trieb 111.335
Ostafin could only withdraw his guilty plea if the court could not modify
the sentence to allow for "good time" and uphold the intent of the plea
bargain. 336
CRIMINAL LAW-POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE
FALCON V. STATE
In Falcon v. State,33 7 the court reviewed a trial court decision
denying a petition for post-conviction relief.338 In 1995, Robert Falcon
was convicted of terrorizing and preventing the arrest or discharge of
other duties. 339 Falcon originally appealed his conviction to the North
Dakota Supreme Court, where the court affirmed Falcon's conviction
and stated that Falcon's claim of ineffective counsel could be pursued at
a post-conviction proceeding. 340 In his petition for post-conviction
relief, Falcon asserted that he had received ineffective counsel during his
trial. Falcon also requested a change of judge to hear his petition. 34 1
The trial court repeatedly denied Falcon's petition for a change of
judge, and in March of 1997, the trial court denied Falcon's post-
conviction petition. 342  The Supreme Court then accepted Falcon's
332. Id.
333. Id. 15.
334. Id. 17, 564 N.W.2d at 619-20.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. 1997 N.D. 200, 570 N.W.2d 719.
338. Falcon v. State, 1997 N.D. 200 1,570 N.W.2d 719, 720.
339. Id. 2, 570 N.W.2d at 720.
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appeal of the trial court's order, asserting that the court had jurisdiction
to review the lower court's decision. 343
North Dakota law provides for the change of a judge upon
petition. 344 Such a petition must be made in good faith, and must assert
that the judge has not ruled upon any matter pertaining to the action. 345
The petition for change of judge will be denied if the judge who has the
potential to be disqualified has already ruled on a matter pertaining to
the action. 346 In the present case, Falcon asserts that the post-conviction
proceeding is a new proceeding, separate from his criminal trial. 347
Falcon supports his assertion by citing the North Dakota Supreme
Court's decision that post-conviction proceedings are civil rather than
criminal in nature. 348 Falcon's assertions caused on the court to deter-
mine whether the civil post-conviction proceeding was actually a separate
proceeding from the underlying criminal action. 349
The court ultimately concluded that a post-conviction proceeding
is not a new proceeding. 350 Using a Minnesota case with factual simi-
larities to Falcon's case for support, the court adopted the perspective
that post-conviction proceedings are merely an extension of criminal
prosecution. 351 In further support of its decision, the court looked to an
analogous North Dakota decision rendered in a case involving a probate
proceeding. 352 The court also looked to the policy purposes behind the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act adopted by the state of North
Dakota. 353 The court determined that the purposes of the Post-Convic-
tion Act would be advanced by having the convicting court review
post-conviction petitions.354 However, the court also found commentary
343. See id. 5 (stating that N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 6 and N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-14 (1991)
gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the trial court decision).
344. See id. 917, 570 N.W.2d at 720-21 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21(1), (3), (4) (1991 &
1997)).
345. See id. 570 N.W.2d at 721 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21(4)).
346. See id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21(3)).
347. See id. 9.
348. See id. 9 9. Falcon's assertion concerned the North Dakota Supreme Court decision in State
v. Jensen, 333 N.W.2d 686, 690 (1983) (stating that post-conviction motions are independent civil
actions).
349. Id.
350. See id. 9 18, 570 N.W.2d at 723.
351. Id. 9 16 (quoting Johnson v. State, 486 N.W.2d 825, 827 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)).
352. Id. 91 10, 570 N.W.2d at 721-22 (citing Estate of Ketterling, 515 N.W.2d 158, 166 (N.D.
1994)).
353. Id. 91 12, 570 N.W.2d at 722 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-03(l)(1991)).
354. See id. 1 12
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that indicated that there is neither a general rule favoring, nor
disfavoring, submission of a post-conviction petition to the same judge
who originally presided over the criminal action. 355 Although no clear
policy predominates, the court recognized that no policy currently
existed prohibiting the trial judge from hearing the post-conviction
petition. 356 Relying on a wide variety of sources, the court concluded
that a party bringing a post-conviction petition is not entitled to a new
judge when the reviewing judge also presided over the trial. 357 There-
fore, according to North Dakota law, the post-conviction proceeding
should be heard by the same judge, absent a showing of bias or
prejudice. 358
After rejecting Falcon's petition for a new judge, the court
considered his claim of ineffective counsel at trial. 359 Falcon claimed
that his attorney failed to object, or limit the cumulative nature, of hear-
say testimony offered by the State at his trial. 360 The hearsay involved
concerns statements made by Falcon's wife to several. individuals after
she fled from Falcon. 361 Witnesses to the statements testified at Falcon's
trial about their content and Falcon's attorney did not object or attempt
to limit the cumulative nature of the testimony. 362 In spite of Falcon's
complaints, the lower court stated in its opinion from Falcon's post-
conviction hearing, that had the objections been made, they would have
been overruled.363
355. See id. 14. The current practice appears to be to submit the petition for post-conviction
relief to the same judge because of the judge's familiarity with the case. Id. (citing The AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION'S STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1980)). However, there are obvious
disadvantages and risks in allowing the same judge to preside. Id. Therefore, either general policy
would be acceptable. Id.
356. See id. 15, 570 N.W.2d at 722-23 (citing Berg v. State, 403 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that it is acceptable for the trial judge to hear the post-conviction petition)).
357. Id. 19, 570 N.W.2d at 723. The court noted that N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-27 (1991)
specifically makes an exception to the court's rule when proceedings to modify an order for alimony,
property division, child support, or child custody are involved. See id.
358. Id. 18.
359. Id. 2 21, 570 N.W.2d at 724.
360. Id. 20, 570 N.W.2d at 723-24.
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In considering the statements made by Falcon's wife, the court
examined the excited utterances exception to the hearsay rule. 364 The
court found that statements are permissible if a startling event or con-
dition had been established, and the statement of the declarant had been
produced from stress or excitement caused by the startling event or
condition. 365 In the present case, Falcon's wife testified that she had
been scared and crying at the time that she made her statements to
witnesses. 366 Since proper foundation relating to Falcon's wife's state of
mind had been laid at trial, the court concluded that the evidence would
have been admissible over any objections. 367 Therefore, the court af-
firmed the lower court's denial of post-conviction relief because it found
that Falcon had been provided with effective assistance of counsel at his
trial .368
CRIMINAL LAW-PRIOR BAD ACTS
STATE V. OSIER
In State v. Osier,36 9 Mark Osier appealed from a conviction of
engaging in sexual contact with a minor under fifteen years of age. 370
Osier was charged with six separate counts of engaging in sexual
intercourse with his daughter when she was under age fifteen.37 1 His
daughter testified about the sexual intercourse and a doctor corroborated
her story. 372 Osier's niece also testified about prior incidents of Osier
sexually fondling her. 373 The trial court admitted the niece's testimony
and instructed the jury it was for the limited purpose of "showing
motive, scheme, or plan with respect to the offense charged." 374 A jury
found Osier guilty. 375 Osier appealed. 376
364. See id. 23 (citing N.D. R. EVID. 803(2)); State v. Whalen, 520 N.W.2d 830, 832 (N.D.
1994).
365. Id. (citing N.D. R. EvID. 803(2)).
366. Id. 24.
367. See id. 25, 570 N.W.2d at 724-25.
368. Id. 1 26, 570 N.W.2d at 725.
369. 1997 N.D. 170, 569 N.W.2d 441.
370. State v. Osier, 1997 N.D. 170,1 1,569 N.W.2d 441, 441.
371. Id. 2 2, 569 N.W.2d at 442.
372. Id. 12, 569 N.W.2d at 444-45.
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Osier argued that the trial court committed a reversible error by
allowing his niece to testify about prior incidents of being sexually
fondled. 377 According to Rule 404(b), N.D. R. Evid., the admission of
evidence of a prior bad act is generally not admissible "unless it is sub-
stantially relevant for some purpose other than to point out the defen-
dant's criminal character and thus to show the probability that he acted
in conformity therewith." 378 Evidence of prior bad acts is not auto-
matically admitted merely because the proponent states a proper purpose
for the evidence. 379 The relevance of the evidence and its probative
value must be demonstrated. 380
At trial, the State failed to specify how Osier's behavior with his
niece eight years prior to the alleged acts with his daughter was relevant
to any material issue, or that it satisfied any of the purposes included in
Rule 404(b), N.D. R. Evid.381 The North Dakota Supreme Court found
that the niece's testimony was used to show that Osier had a criminal
sexual character that favored young girls, and that it was likely that he
committed the charged acts.382 Such use of this evidence is prohibited
under Rule 404(b), N.D. R. Evid.383
The court warned of the dangers of allowing this type of evidence
and tempting a jury to convict a defendant for his past actions instead of
on evidence of the charged crime. 384 In a criminal case, the prosecution
may not introduce evidence simply to prove the defendant was morally
deficient or possessed criminal tendencies, generally or specifically. 385
In the case at hand, there was no permissible basis for admitting the
niece's testimony concerning Osier's prior sexual conduct.386 The State
did not show enough of a connection between Osier's sexual fondling of
his niece and the alleged acts of intercourse with his daughter to warrant
admitting the prior bad acts. 387
377. Id. 1 3.
378. Id. 1 4 (quoting State v. Biby, 366 N.W.2d 460, 463 (N.D. 1985)).
379. Id. 4 (referring to Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 70 (N.D. 1981)).
380. Id. 4 (referring to Dahlen, 314 N.W.2d at 70).
381. Id. 5.
382. Id.
383. Id., 569 N.W.2d at 443.
384. Id. 6.
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The court found no permissible basis in Osier, under Rule 404(b),
N.D. R. Evid., for admitting the niece's testimony. 388 Her testimony was
not relevant to a genuine issue regarding motive, plan, or any other listed
exception under the rule. 389 The prosecution's only purpose was to
show Osier's criminal sexual character and to illustrate that he likely act-
ed in conformity therewith and committed the charged crimes. 390 The
court stated that it is fundamentally unfair to tempt a jury to convict a
defendant based on circumstances of prior bad acts rather than upon the
evidence of the crime charged. 39 1 The court held that the trial court's
admission of the niece's prior bad acts testimony was erroneous. 392 The
court found that Osier's niece's testimony was not harmless error and
could not be disregarded. 393 It was possible that her testimony was high-
ly prejudicial to the jury. 394 The jury may have reached a different deci-
sion absent the erroneous admission of the prior bad acts involving the
niece. 395 The court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial. 396
388. Id. 9[ 8.
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CRIMINAL LAW-PRISONS-MIRANDA WARNINGS
STATE V. CONLEY
In State v. Conley, 397 an inmate at the state penitentiary appealed a
district court judgment entered based on a conditional guilty plea. 3 9 8
Lundy Conley pled guilty to possession of contraband useful for escape
from prison, but reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his
suppression motion. 3 99 At an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
Conley's motion to suppress statements made to prison officials without
advising him of his Miranda rights.
400
Prison officials found various false identification in Conley's work
area in the prison. 40 1 Conley was then placed in an administrative deten-
tion cell in the penitentiary. 40 2 As part of the investigation of the inci-
dent, the Captain of the state penitentiary, Brian Jorgenson, spoke with
Conley. 4 03 Jorgenson had Conley brought to a staff office for a discus-
sion of the incident, and the guards informed Conle, that Jorgenson had
requested that Conley come see him. 404 Following prison policy, guards
handcuffed Conley prior to bringing him from the detention cell to the
office.4 0
5
In the office, Conley read the incident report and then Jorgenson
discussed and asked Conley questions about the incident. 40 6 Jorgenson
informed Conley that he was only gathering information relating to
the incident and needed to determine whether Conley denied or admitted
the incident. 4 07 The interview lasted from twenty to twenty-five min-
utes. 408 During the interview only Jorgenson and Conley were present in
the room. 4 09 Conley was handcuffed the entire time.4 10 After the inter-
view with Jorgenson, Conley later appeared at an adjustment committee
hearing. 4 11 Conley was handcuffed throughout the hearing.4 12 At the
hearing, the committee provided Conley with a form that told him he
397. 1998 ND 5, 574 N.W.2d 569.
398. State v. Conley, 1998 N.D. 5, 1, 574 N.W.2d 569, 569.
399. Id. 7, 574 N.W.2d at 572.
400. Id.
401. Id. 2, 574 N.W.2d at 571.
402. Id.
403. Id. 91 3.
404. Id.
405. Id.





411. Id. 5, 574 N.W.2d at 572.
412. Id.
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had the right to remain silent, and anything said at the hearing could be
used against him at a later time. 413 At the hearing, Conley also admitted
that he had manufactured and possessed the false identification items
found. 4 14
Conley was later charged with violating North Dakota Century Code
Section 12.1-08-09 (1995), and the trial court ruled that the statements
made to Jorgenson and the adjustment committee were admissible. 4 15
The trial court determined that a reasonable person would not think that
they were obligated to remain at the either the meeting with Jorgenson or
at the adjustment committee hearing.4 16 The trial court also determined
that no actual interrogation of Conley had taken place. 417 Therefore, the
trial court concluded that Conley was not "in custody" at the time his
statements were made, making Miranda warnings unnecessary. 4 18 Con-
ley entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charges against him, but
reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 419
In reviewing Conley's appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court
found that the trial court's determination on whether questioning by
nature is investigatory or custodial is fully reviewable on appeal.420 The
court stated that adequate procedural safeguards of a person's rights
during an interrogation are present when Miranda warnings are given.421
However, Miranda warnings are required only when the accused is in
custody, or has experienced some other significant deprivation of
freedom. 422
The court's analysis of whether Conley was actually "in custody"
when he made his statements required looking at special case law
concerning the need for Miranda warnings in a prison setting. 423 The
court held that incarceration does not imply that an inmate is "in cus-
tody" for Miranda purposes. 424 A demonstration of an added imposi-
tion on the inmate's freedom is required.425 As part of this requirement,
413. Id. 6.
414. Id.




419. Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 1 I(a)(2)).
420. Id. 8 (citing State v. Martin, 543 N.W.2d 224, 226 (N.D. 1996)).
421. Id. 9.
422. Id. 1 10, 574 N.W.2d at 572-73 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
423. See id. 11 10-12. The court looked at several federal cases that have attempted to create a
standard for determining when a prison inmate should be informed of their Miranda rights in an
investigation. Id. (citing Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968)); Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d
424, 427 (9th Cir. 1978); (and numerous other cases).
424. Id. 1 12, 574 N.W.2d at 573.
425. Id.
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the court will look at the totality of the circumstances of the investigation
to determine if a reasonable person in the inmate's position would
believe that he was in custody. 426 Statements made by the prisoner, when
the prisoner has not experienced more than usual restraint of movement,
do not require Miranda warnings.4 27
In his argument, Conley maintained that he was in custody during
the interview with Jorgenson and during the committee hearing. 428 Con-
ley asserted that he was handcuffed during the questionings, the ques-
tioning was not at the scene of the incident, and thus he had greater
restriction of movement than other prisoners by being placed in admini-
strative detention cell. 429 These factors indicated that Conley actually
had been in custody during the questioning. 430 The court found that
Conley had been in custody during Jorgenson's questioning, and dis-
agreed with the state's attempts to classify the questioning as merely
"information gathering." 43 1 The court found that the purpose of the
questioning was to determine Conley's culpability, not simply to investi-
gate the incident. 432 The court also found it significant that Conley had
been handcuffed during the questioning and the subsequent disciplinary
hearing. 433
The court concluded that Conley had also been in custody during
the disciplinary hearing. 434 The nature of the disciplinary hearing was
such that criminal charges were a likely possibility.4 35 If criminal
charges are a realistic possibility following a disciplinary hearing, then
Miranda warnings should be given. 436 Since the committee did not
inform Conley that his statements could be used against him in criminal
proceedings, the committee may have misled Conley into believing the
statements could not be used in court. 437 The court decided that in
examining the totality of circumstances, a reasonable prisoner in
Conley's position would believe that he was in custody, and the failure to
give Conley his Miranda warnings made the statements made
426. See id. 13 (citing Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1988); Garcia v. Single-
tary, 13 F.3d 1487, 1492 (1 lth Cir. 1994)).
427. Id.





433. See id. 16, 22, 574 N.W.2d at 574, 576.
434. Id. 22, 574 N.W.2d at 576.
435. See id. 23. The court found that it was important that the sole recommendation made by
the committee concerning Conley was that the incident report be forwarded to the prosecutor's office
for possible charges. Id.
436. Id. 24 (citing McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1234 (Alaska 1975)).
437. Id. 25.
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inadmissible.438 The court reversed the trial court's judgment, and
allowed Conley to withdraw his guilty plea.439
The court did address the issue of whether there is a requirement of
Miranda warnings during disciplinary hearings at a prison. 440 The court
noted that some courts have found that statements made at a prison
disciplinary hearing, absent a Miranda warning, are inadmissible at a
later criminal trial.44 1 The court also cited case law where courts have
found that a prisoner is immune from the affirmative use of statements
made in a disciplinary hearing at subsequent criminal proceedings.4 42
The court stated that it agreed with the principle that prisoners should
not have to choose between incriminating themselves at a disciplinary
hearing, or foregoing the right to testify at such hearings, and being
subjected to penalties for misconduct based on evidence that they cannot
refute. 443 However, because Conley did not initially raise the issue on
appeal, the court could not use these principles to decide the case.444
Chief Justice VandeWalle offered a concurring opinion in the
case. 445 In his concurrence, Justice VandeWalle discussed the majority
opinion's reliance on the fact that Miranda warnings were required
because Conley had been the "focus" of an investigation. 446 Justice
VandeWalle raised the issue that mere investigatory focus does not
require the giving of Miranda warnings. 447 Justice VandeWalle stated
that being the "focus" of an investigation should only be one factor out
of many in determining whether a reasonable person would believe that
they were in custody.
4 48
438. Id. 91 26.
439. Id. 27.
440. Id. 18, 574 N.W.2d at 574.
441. Id. 1 19, 574 N.W.2d at 575 (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Cluthcette v.
Procunier 497 F.2d 809, 823 (9th Cir. 1974); Grant v. State, 270 S.E.2d 42, 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980);
State v. Harris, 576 P.2d 257, 258 (Mont. 1978).
442. Id. 91 19 (citing Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1092-93 (M.D. Fla. 1973)); Carter
v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787, 795 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1233-35
(Alaska 1975); People v. Carr, 386 N.W.2d 631, 634 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Avant v. Clifford, 341
A.2d 629, 653 (N.J. 1975)).
443. Id.
444. Id. 91 21.
445. Id. 9129, 574 N.W.2d at 576.
446. Id.
447. Id. (citing State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 406 (N.D. 1980)).
448. Id. at 11 30 (citing State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 790 (Iowa 1994)).
600 [VOL. 74:567
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURES
STATE V. HERRICK
In State v. Herrick,449 Curtis Herrick appealed from the trial court's
judgment and conviction concerning the possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to manufacture, possession of a controlled substance,
and possession of drug paraphernalia.4 50 Herrick argued that the trial
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence. He
claimed that the search of his garbage cans and the issuance of the
no-knock warrant violated his right against an unreasonable search and
seizure.451 Herrick also claimed that the warrant was issued without
probable cause, and that the magistrate was biased.
452
In February of 1995, an officer of the Jamestown Police De-
partment's Drug Task Force searched garbage cans located near an alley
at the back of Herrick's property. 453 The cans were on Herrick's
property, approximately three feet from the alley's edge.4 54 When the
cans were searched, a paper clip with marijuana residue, a seed, and a
stem were found.455 Another search of Herrick's garbage cans occurred
in January of 1996 by two officers from the Narcotics Task Force.
456
The cans were approximately four feet from the alley. 457 Bent metal
wires, two stems, four seeds, and a note describing ways to grow mari-
juana were found in one bag of trash.458 Based on the information from
these two searches, a search warrant was applied for by an officer of the
Narcotics Task Force. 459 The magistrate asked if the officer wanted a
"no-knock" nighttime warrant, to which the officer responded,
"yes." 4 60 When questioned during an evidentiary hearing, the officer
stated that a no-knock warrant was needed because marijuana can be
easily destroyed. 461 On January 2, 1996, the no-knock warrant was
executed at Herrick's house. 462 Officers found marijuana, marijuana
seeds and stems, equipment used for indoor horticulture, a book entitled
449. 1997 N.D. 155, 567 N.W.2d 336.
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Indoor Marijuana Horticulture, and several items of drug parapher-
nalia. 463 Herrick appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress the evidence. 464
Herrick contends that the garbage can search violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of
the North Dakota Constitution. 465 Herrick argued that the garbage cans
were on his property and that he had an expectation of privacy concern-
ing their contents. 466 The Court referred to their holding in State v. Ryd-
berg,4 67 which found that a person who placed garbage on or against an
alley, exposed to the general public and abandoned to the trash collector,
waives any privacy interest in the garbage. 468 The Court also relied on
the North Dakota Constitution, and stated that a person's expectation of
privacy concerning his garbage must be objectively reasonable to be pro-
tected. 469 The cans were placed near the alley where the unknown trash
collectors picked them up, and where other unknown people could
rummage through them.470 Therefore, the Court found Herrick did not
have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, and following Ryd-
berg, he waived any expectation of privacy concerning the garbage.471
In addition, Herrick argued that the magistrate demonstrated bias in
issuing the no-knock, nighttime warrant. 472 A warrant must be issued by
a neutral and detached magistrate.4 73 However, there was nothing in the
record that demonstrated the magistrate was biased. 474
Herrick also disputed whether there was probable cause to issue a
warrant. 475 The Court, citing Rydberg, reviewed this issue under the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach. 476 Herrick argued that it was
possible that another person could have dropped the seeds and stems
into his garbage. 477 The probable cause standard necessary to obtain a
search warrant "exists if it is established that certain identifiable objects





467. 519 N.W.2d 306, (N.D. 1994).
468. Herrick, 1997 N.D. 155,19, 567 N.W.2d at 339.
469. Id.
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found at the present time at an identifiable place." 478 The court relied
upon a 1995 case, where they found it reasonable for a magistrate to
conclude from the presence of marijuana seeds in the trash, that there
was probably more marijuana in the house. 479 Therefore, in the case at
hand, the officers had probable cause to apply for the search warrant
under Rydberg.480
Herrick argued that under the circumstances, it was not reasonable
to issue a no-knock warrant.481 All searches and seizures must be reason-
able, and when officers enter a dwelling, they must knock and announce
their presence. 482 This knock and announce rule is flexible.4 83 The
safety of officers and the integrity of evidence may exempt officers
from this knock and announce element of reasonableness. 484 In Rich-
ards v. Wisconsin,485 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
need for no-knock warrant in drug cases. 486 Often, drug cases involve
the threat of physical violence and the likelihood that evidence will be
destroyed.4 87 However, in Richards, the United States Supreme Court
did not agree with Wisconsin's per se no-knock exception for drug
cases. 488 In each case, courts must decide whether the facts and circum-
stances justify a no-knock warrant. 489 In attempting to obtain a no-
knock warrant, the officers must have a reasonable suspicion that the
announcement of their presence would jeopardize the search. 490
According to N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-32(3), probable cause is required
to obtain a no-knock warrant. 491 In Herrick, the Court overruled its prior
case law, and following the United States Supreme Court, held per-se
rules in drug cases justifying the issuance of no-knock warrants are not
permissible. 492 A no-knock warrant should not be automatically issued
based upon mere allegations that drugs are present.4 93 In Herrick, the
officer was searching for evidence that the suspect was growing mari-
478. Id. (quoting State v. Rydberg, 519 N.W.2d 306, 308 (N.D. 1994)).
479. Id. 14 (referring to State v. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d 275, 278 (N.D. 1995)).
480. Id. 15, 567 N.W.2d at 340-41.




485. 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
486. Herrick, 1997 N.D. 155, 18, 567 N.W.2d at 341 (describing Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S.
Ct. 1416, 1421; 520 U.S. (((1997)).




491. Id. 19, 567 N.W.2d at 341-42.
492. Id. 2 21,567 N.W.2d at 342.
493. Id.
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juana. 494 The evidence vas not limited to marijuana but included lights,
growing equipment, fertilizer, phone records, bills, and drug parapher-
nalia. 495 This evidence would not be easily destroyed. 496 The court
found that the officer did not meet the burden of demonstrating her
need for a no-knock warrant.4 97 The judgment of conviction and the
order denying suppression were reversed.4 98 In its brief, the State urged
the trial court to adopt the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule. 499 However, Herrick never responded to this issue at trial. 500 The
court declined to decide this issue without adequate briefing. 50 1
Therefore, the court remanded Herrick to the trial court to consider




In Whitmire v. Whitmire,50 3 Burton Whitmire appealed the denial by
a district court of a motion to quash an emergency ex parte order
awarding his former spouse, Audree, custody of their daughter, Sierra.504
Burton also appealed the subsequent Second Amended Judgment issued
by the district court. 505 Burton and Audree Whitmire were divorced in
December, 1996.506 The stipulated divorce judgment gave Audree pri-
mary physical custody of Sierra, and gave Burton reasonable visita-
tion. 50 7 On March 21, 1997, Burton had a scheduled visitation with
Sierra. 508 However, instead of picking Sierra up at 6 p.m. as directed by
the judgment, Burton picked Sierra up from her daycare provider's
house at 10:15 a.m.. 509 Audree attempted to reach Sierra by phone over
the weekend, but proved unable to contact her.5 10 Audree then con-
494. Id. 1 22.
495. Id.
496. Id. 9123, 567 N.W.2d at 343.
497. Id.
498. Id. 1 28, 567 N.W.2d at 344.
499. Id. 9125, 567 N.W.2d at 343.
500. Id.
501. Id. 9128, 567 N.W.2d at 344.
502. Id.
503. 1997 N.D. 214, 570 N.W.2d 231.
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tacted Burton's family, and Burton's grandmother informed her that
Burton had taken Sierra to Jamaica.5 11
By Sunday night Sierra had not been returned on time and Audree
could not locate her anywhere. Audree reported Sierra's disappearance
to the police. 512 After Burton had not reported for work on March 24,
1997, Audree filed an "Emergency Motion to Modify the Divorce
Judgment With Respect to Custody of the Minor Child" along with a
supporting affidavit.513 Audree's emergency motion requested sole cus-
tody of Sierra and asked that all of Burton's visitations be supervised
until further order of the court. 5 14 The trial court granted Audree's
motion. 515 Audree's attorney then served the emergency order on Bur-
ton, through his attorney. 5 16 Burton filed a motion to quash the emer-
gency order due to a lack of a prior evidentiary hearing to determine the
necessity of the order.517 Burton also requested a hearing on the neces-
sity and validity of the order, but did not offer a scheduled time for the
hearing. 5 18
On April 4, 1997, Audree's counsel had the clerk enter the Second
Amended Judgment restricting Burton's visitation. 5 19 At the time the
judgment was entered, there had been no evidentiary hearing on the
matter. 520 The trial court denied Burton's motion to quash the emer-
gency order. 52 1 Burton subsequently appealed the trial court's order,
denying his motion to quash and the Second Amended Judgment, to the
North Dakota Supreme Court. 522 In reviewing this case, the court noted
that Audree's counsel had confused the procedural process required to
obtain an emergency order. 523 Audree had improperly combined an
interim motion for the temporary order with the main motion to amend
the custody judgment. 524 North Dakota law does permit the issuance of
ex parte interim orders as long as exceptional circumstances are
demonstrated. 525 However, the court stated that ordinarily a parent in













523. Id. 911, 570 N.W.2d at 235.
524. Id.
525. Id. 11, 570 N.W.2d at 233.
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make a motion for an interim temporary order pending full hearing on
the motion. 526 Therefore, Audree erred because she did not frame each
motion separately. 527 Audree's motion also failed to notify Burton that
according to NDROC 8.2(a)(5)(A) he was entitled to a hearing on the
necessity of the order upon written motion. 528 However, the court does
not place all of the procedural blame on Audree's counsel, stating that
the trial court could have refused to issue an ex parte order that did not
state the notice required. 529
In spite of the procedural irregularities perpetrated by Audree, Bur-
ton also committed an important procedural error. 530 Although Burton
did respond to Audree's request for an emergency hearing in a timely
fashion, his motion to quash did not conform to expected procedure.53 1
Burton failed to include an evidentiary affidavit to challenge the
presence of an emergency, or to support the need for an evidentiary
hearing. 532  The court stated that the party contesting the need for an
emergency temporary order must do so with affidavits. 533 The court con-
cluded that because Audree had adequately demonstrated an emergency
with her affidavit, and Burton failed to contest the presence of an
emergency, the trial court was justified in refusing to quash the emer-
gency order.534 While the court did uphold the trial court's denial of
Burton's motion to quash the emergency ex parte order, the court re-
versed the entry of the Second Amended Judgment. 535 The court stated
that an emergency ex parte order cannot modify a final custody judg-
ment, except temporarily pending further proceedings. 536 The court
then remanded the case for further proceedings stating that the parties
needed to schedule the necessary hearings with the court to determine
the necessity of the emergency order.537
526. Id. 1 12.
527. See id.
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FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT
DICKSON V. DICKSON
In Dickson v. Dickson,538 Stephanie Dickson appealed from an
amended divorce judgment. 539 In 1993, Stephanie and Thomas Dickson
divorced. 540 The district court awarded Stephanie custody.541 The court
awarded Thomas reasonable visitation, ordered him to pay $1600 per
month child support, and to pay all noncovered medical expenses. 542 In
1994, the divorce judgment was amended regarding visitation condi-
tions. 543 On August 28, 1995, the court allowed Stephanie to move to
New York with the child and amended the judgment a second time.
544
On November 8, 1995, Stephanie returned to North Dakota and re-
quested that the court reinstate child support and visitation as specified
under the first amended judgment. 545 On June 6, 1996, the court en-
tered a third amended judgment. 54 6 The third amended judgment
awarded "joint legal custody" to Stephanie and Thomas. 547 Also, the
third amended judgment required Stephanie to notify Thomas if the
child was to be out of her care for over thirty-six hours to allow Thomas
to exercise his visitation and ordered Thomas to pay $1683 per month in
child support and two-thirds of the child's noncovered medical costs.
548
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed "whether the trial
court erred in modifying the custody order from 'sole legal custody' to
'joint legal custody' without finding a significant change in circum-
stances." 549 North Dakota law does not separately define "legal cus-
tody" and "physical custody."550 Accordingly, the court was unwilling
to separate "legal custody" without approval for the North Dakota
Legislature.551 However, trial courts can allocate various rights to the
noncustodial parent. 552 According to N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22, in a divorce
action the court "may give such direction for the custody, care, and
538. 1997 N.D. 167, 568 N.W.2d 284.
539. Dickson v. Dickson, 1997 N.D. 167, 1,568 N.W.2d 284, 285, overruled by Jarvis v. Jarvis,









548. Id. 4, 16, 568 N.W.2d at 285, 288.
549. Id. 6, 568 N.W.2d at 285-86.
550. Id. 9[ 8, 568 N.W.2d at 286.
551. Id. 919, 568 N.W.2d at 287.
552. Id. 91 10.
6071998]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or
proper." 55 3 Prior North Dakota case law held that allocations of such
reasonable rights are effective even if they are defined as "joint legal
custody." 554 However, in the case at hand, the trial court granted "joint
legal custody" without definition. 55 5 The court concluded that "'joint
legal custody' is a meaningless amorphism, and its award is without legal
significance." 5 5 6 Since the trial court probably intended to grant
Thomas Dickson rights which it did not specify, the court remanded the
case to the trial court to define the rights granted to Thomas. 5 57
The court also affirmed the trial court's order which required
Stephanie to contact Thomas when the child was to be out of her care for
more than thirty-six hours. 558 This notification was to allow Thomas to
exercise his visitation during this time period. 559 The court reviewed the
order under the clearly erroneous standard. 560 The court held that the
trial court's order of condition of visitation was "reasonable and work-
able." 5 6 1 Therefore, the court concluded that a mistake had not
occurred and the order was not clearly erroneous. 5 62 Thus, the court
affirmed the order.56
3
Under the original divorce judgment, Thomas was ordered to pay
all of the child's noncovered medical expenses. 56 4 In the second
amended judgment, the court modified Thomas' payment to two-thirds
of the child's noncovered medical expenses. 5 65 Stephanie argued the
trial court erred in refusing to pay all of the child's medical costs in the
1996 amended judgment. 5 66 The court disagreed with Stephanie and
affirmed the trial court's order. 5 6 7  The trial court could not order
Thomas to pay an additional amount of noncovered medical ex-
penses. 5 6 8 This would be an upward deviation from the child support
guideline amount. North Dakota Admin. Code section 72-02-04.1-
553. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22(1) (1997)).
554. Id.
555. Id. I 11.
556. Id.
557. Id. The court did not address whether there had been a significant change in circumstances,
since the term "joint legal custody" was meaningless and did not cause a modification in this case. Id.
12.
558. Id. 15, 568 N.W.2d at 287-88.
559. Id. 13, 568 N.W.2d at 287.
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09(2) provides a list of criteria that would justify a deviation in child
support from the guideline amount.569 Stephanie offered no evidence to
support an upward deviation from the guidelines. 570 Therefore, the
court affirmed the trial court's order regarding the child's noncovered
medical expenses. 57'
Stephanie also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her attorney fees. 572 According to N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23, a trial
court may award attorney fees. 573 A trial court's decision concerning
attorney fees in an action for divorce will not be disturbed on appeal
unless the court abused its discretion. 574 The guidelines for awarding
attorney fees in a divorce action compare one spouse's need and the
other's ability to pay. 575 In this case, the court found that Thomas was
not obliged to aid Stephanie since she chose to continue her education
instead of working full time. 576 Therefore, the trial court's denial of
attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion and the court affirmed the
decision .577
FAMILY LAW-HUSBAND AND WIFE-PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS AND WILLS
ESTATE OF LuTz V. SCHNEIDER
In Estate of Lutz v. Schneider,578 Lavilla Lutz appealed two sum-
mary judgments. The first one dismissed her claim for extraordinary
services provided to her husband, Emanuel Lutz, before his death. The
second addressed elective share and exempt allowances from Emanuel's
estate. 579 Lavilla also appealed an order which distributed Emanuel's
estate.580
Lavilla and Emanuel met when he was almost sixty and she was
fifty-three. 58 1 A few years later, they discussed marriage. 582 Emanuel
wanted Lavilla to sign a premarital agreement giving the bulk of his prop-
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Emanuel promised to take care of her. 584 Lavilla met with Emanuel's
attorney and signed a marriage agreement, consents to wills, and wills for
both her and Emanuel. 585 Emanuel and Lavilla each waived any share in
the other's estate in the premarital agreement. 586 Emanuel's will gave
Lavilla a life estate in the home and all furniture and household items in
the home. 587 The residuary clause of his will stated, "[imn the event
Lavilla does not survive me, all of the rest and remainder of my property
. . . to my children." 588 Emanuel's will was silent about the residue's
disposition if Lavilla survived him.589 Lavilla did not consult with
independent counsel before signing the documents. 590 Emanuel and
Lavilla married in 1988.591
In 1991, Emanuel became ill.592 Lavilla cared for Emanuel for
three years.593 When doctors informed Emanuel his illness was terminal,
he begged Lavilla not to place him in a nursing home. 594 Lavilla cared
for Emanuel at home. 595 In 1994, Emanuel died. 596
Lavilla filed a creditor's claim for her extraordinary services pro-
vided to Emanuel while he was ill.597 His children disallowed her
claim. 598 Lavilla petitioned the trial court. 599 The trial court granted the
children's motion for summary judgment finding that there was no
express agreement to compensate Lavilla and no evidence to support an
implied agreement. 600  Lavilla petitioned for an elective share of
Emanuel's estate, a family allowance, an exempt property allowance, and
a homestead allowance. 601 The children moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Lavilla waived all those rights in the premarital agree-
ment.602 Lavilla claimed that the premarital agreement was involuntary
since she did not have independent counsel, and that the agreement was
584. Id.
585. Id. 7 3.
586. Id. 8.
587. Id. 9, 563 N.W.2d at 92-93.
588. Id. 9, 563 N.W.2d at 93.
589. Id.
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unconscionable since it was particularly one-sided. 603 The trial court
granted summary judgment and dismissed Lavilla's claims. 604
Emanuel's children petitioned for the distribution of the estate, in-
cluding the household property and a life occupancy of half of
Emanuel's duplex home. 605 Lavilla objected, arguing that Emanuel's
residuary gift to his children occurred only if she did not survive
Emanuel. 606 The trial court concluded that the will was ambiguous and
relied on the premarital agreement to interpret the will. 607 The trial court
approved the children's petition.608
On appeal, Lavilla contended that Emanuel's estate was enriched by
her extraordinary services because she did not place him in a nursing
home. 609 The children argue that nurses aids helped Lavilla care for
Emanuel near the end, a nursing home was not the only option, and
Lavilla admitted that she had not expected to be paid. 6 10 Also, they
contended that Lavilla received many benefits from the marriage.611 A
person who performs substantial services for another person without an
express compensation agreement usually becomes entitled to the reason-
able value of the services. 6 12 However, if the services are performed by a
family member living with the recipient, it is presumed that the services
were gratuitous and compensation was not intended.613 A family claim-
ant has the burden of overcoming the presumption against compensation
by proof that the services were not gratuitous but extraordinary. 6 14 All
the surrounding circumstances and facts should be considered by the
court. 615 Generally, summary judgment is inapplicable for this factual
inquiry. 6 16
The conflicting evidence concerning Lavilla's services created
material factual disputes about whether her services were exceptional and
so devoid of mutuality as to imply a contract under which she would be
paid. 617 Lavilla offered a multitude of evidence concerning the extra-







609. Id. 9115, 563 N.W.2d at 94.
610. Id. 16.
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612. Id. (citing Estate of Raketti v. Leino, 340 N.W.2d 894, 901 (N.D. 1983)).
613. Id. (citing Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d at 901).
614. Id.
615. Id. (citing Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d at 902).
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617. Id. $ 19, 563 N.W.2d at 94-95.
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of his life.618 The court found that this evidence necessitated factual find-
ings. 6 19 The children argue Lavilla said that she did not expect to be
paid for her services. 620 However, the court stated that an isolated re-
mark is not dispositive since it was based upon Lavilla's initial expecta-
tion when she started her services, and may have changed. 62 1 According
to Lavilla, it was not until Emanuel became terminally ill and pleaded for
her to keep him out of a nursing home, that she agreed to care for
him. 622 The effect of Emanuel's request and the extent of the mutuality
of benefits are factors appropriately weighed at trial and do not support
a summary judgment. 623
Next, the court addressed the premarital agreements between Lavilla
and Emanuel. 624 Lavilla argued that her premarital agreements were
unenforceable and unconscionable. 625 Prospective spouses are allowed
to contract the property rights and obligations of each of the parties. 626
A premarital agreement becomes binding upon marriage. 627 However, if
a premarital agreement was not made voluntarily, it is not enforceable. 628
Lavilla argued that her lack of independent counsel rendered the pre-
marital agreement involuntary and unconscionable as a matter of law. 629
Enforceability of premarital agreements was a matter of first impres-
sion for the court. 630 The court followed the dual analysis often used
when evaluating a commercial contract for unconscionability involving
"Procedural Unconscionability" and "Substantive Unconscionabili-
ty."'631 Lavilla argued that the premarital agreements were procedurally
defective because she lacked an independent attorney and because Eman-
uel promised to take care of her "anyway" if she signed the docu-
ments. 632 While Lavilla stated that her husband's attorney never advised
her to seek independent counsel, the attorney stated that he did.633 "A
premarital agreement is not enforceable if the disadvantaged spouse did
not execute it voluntarily." 634 The trial court failed to recognize the
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factual dispute concerning whether Lavilla was adequately advised to
seek an independent attorney.635
The court found that a factor in assessing the voluntariness of a
premarital agreement is the absence or presence of independent legal
counsel. 636 A fiduciary relationship may develop when there is a lack of
an opportunity to consult with an independent attorney. 637 A fiduciary
relationship develops when a person is under a duty to give advice to
another person upon matters within the scope of the relationship. 638 An
agreement to marry can create a fiduciary relationship if the parties are
mismatched in bargaining power and sophistication.639 Generally,
whether a fiduciary relationship exists between parties is a question of
fact.640 Since the evidence conflicts concerning Lavilla receiving advice
on seeking independent counsel, the court found disputed material facts
existed. 641 Therefore, summary judgment was precluded. 642
The children argued that Lavilla's claim that Emanuel promised to
take care of her "anyway" needed to be in writing.643 The court dis-
agreed with this argument finding parole or extrinsic evidence could be
used to show that a contract has no effect due to illegality, fraud, mistake,
or essential elements not being integrated in the written contract.644 The
voluntariness of a premarital agreement could be evidenced by factual
circumstances surrounding an oral promise.645 This factual dispute is
appropriate for trial.646 Therefore, the court reversed the summary judg-
ment decision and remanded for trial the factual questions concerning
the voluntariness and enforceability of Lavilla's and Emanuel's pre-
marital agreements. 647
Next, the court examined the "Substantive Enforceability" of the
premarital agreements. 648 Lavilla argued that the agreements were sub-
stantively unconscionable because they were one-sided. 649 She received
$35,400 of Emanuel's $280,000 estate. 650 Lavilla claimed that her finan-
635. Id.
636. Id. 31.
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cial circumstances would put her in need of public assistance. 65 1
According to N.D.C.C. 14-03.1-06(2), if a premarital agreement causes
one party to be eligible for public assistance at the time or separation or
divorce, the court may require the other party to provide support to
avoid that eligibility. 652 The children did not dispute Lavilla's financial
situation but argued that the statute did not apply because her marriage
ended due to her spouse's death, not divorce. 653 The court interpreted
the statute to include death based upon notes in the Uniform Premarital
Act which is the source of the North Dakota statute. 654 Therefore, the
court found that Lavilla's financial situation needed a factual inquiry by
the trial court to determine unconscionability. 655 As such, the court
determined that summary judgment on this issue was inappropriate. 656
Finally, Lavilla asserted that the trial court should not have dis-
tributed the estate because the will is ambiguous. 657 The trial court used
the premarital agreements as extrinsic evidence when interpreting the
Will. 658 The court found that the trial court's analysis was based on
agreements that may not have been enforceable. 659 Thus, the supreme
court reversed the trial court's interpretation of the will and its order ap-
proving the estate distribution. 660 The supreme court remanded for inter-
pretation of the will after the trial on the premarital agreements. 661 The





In Cermak v. Cermak,663 the North Dakota Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a former spouse's "live-in" relationship
could justify the termination of a permanent spousal support obliga-
tion. 664 The court concluded that a "live-in" relationship does not con-
stitute a remarriage. 665 Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's
651. Id. 42, 563 N.W.2d at 100.
652. Id.
653. Id. 9 43.
654. Id. 44.
655. Id.
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decision. 666 Duane and Loretta Cermak were married in 1964.667 In
1995, Duane obtained a divorce. 668 As part of an Amended Judgment,
Duane was obligated to pay Loretta $600 per month as permanent
spousal support. 669 The judgment provided that the support payments
would continue until Loretta's death or remarriage. 670 The court expres-
sly rejected Duane's request that the court include a provision termina-
ting the support payments should Loretta cohabitate with any person. 67 1
In mid-1995, Loretta took up residence with a man she had been
seeing. 672 Loretta was seeing the man during the pendency of the
divorce proceeding, but the lower court never considered the effect of a
potential "live-in" relationship. 673 Loretta has continued living with the
man, but the couple has not married. 674 In 1996, Duane filed a motion
with the lower court requesting that his support payments be reduced, or
terminated, because of Loretta's "live-in" relationship with another
man. 675 Loretta filed a cross-motion requesting that Duane's motion be
denied, and requesting attorney's fees and costs. 676 The lower court
denied both motions, and both parties have appealed. 677
In looking at the Amended Judgment awarding spousal support to
Loretta, the court recognized that it does not mention cohabitation. 678
The court stated that merely cohabitating with a person is insufficient to
constitute a marriage because North Dakota does not recognize
common-law marriages. 679 Therefore, cohabitation is a nonmarital rela-
tionship and does not possess marital obligations. 680
Since cohabitation is not a marital relationship, the court refused to
accept Duane's argument that Loretta's relationship so closely re-
sembled a marriage that support should be terminated. 681 Additionally,
the court found that Loretta's relationship did not resemble a marriage













678. Id. 9 9 569 N.W.2d at 284.
679. Id. 7, 569 N.W.2d at 283 (citing N.D. CENT-. CODE § 14-03-01 (Supp. 1997)) (stating that
only marriages entered into in accordance with state law are valid).
680. See id. 9, 569 N.W.2d at 284.
681. Id.
682. Id. 1 10.
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the man Loretta was living with may voluntarily contribute to her
support, he had no legal obligation to make such contributions. 683
Therefore, the court found that any support Loretta may be receiving
from her cohabitant came from his benevolence, and that he had no con-
tinuing obligation to provide support. 684 The court was unwilling to
interpret the divorce decree in a manner that left Loretta with such
uncertain means of support. 685
Duane attempted to claim that Loretta would not be left in an unfair
position because she could bring an action against her cohabitant if the
relationship terminates. 686 The court rejected this argument because
they have not expressly recognized the right to bring a "palimony"
action in North Dakota.687 The court has even found that "palimony"
actions are not relevant to breakups of a cohabitation arrangement in the
state. 688 Duane asserted that even if a "palimony" action couldn't be
maintained, Loretta would be entitled to a share of property should her
relationship terminate. 689 The court also rejected this assertion because
mere cohabitation does not create sufficient to create common owner-
ship in property. 690 As a result, the court decided to adopt what it con-
sidered the modem view that, unless provided for in the divorce decree,
cohabitation cannot be the sole basis for the termination of spousal
support.69'
As an alternative pleading, Duane asserted that Loretta's cohabita-
tion constituted a change in circumstance that justified reducing his
spousal support payments. 692 The court rejected this request because
Loretta's relationship had been contemplated at the time of the divorce
proceeding. 693 In order to constitute a change of circumstance, the situ-
ation must be unforeseen at the time of the original divorce decree. 694
In the present case, the fact that Duane had asked to include a provision
683. See id. (citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Me. 1980)) (stating that married
persons assume the legal obligation to support their spouses).
684. Id.
685. Id.
686. See id. I 11 (citing Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992)).
687. See id. (citing Baker v. Baker, 1997 N.D. 135, 1 12, 566 N.W.2d 806; Kohler, 493 N.W.2d
at 649).
688. See id. 9112, 569 N.W.2d at 284-85 (citing Kohler, 493 N.W.2d at 649).
689. Id., 569 N.W.2d at 285.
690. Id. (citing Kohler, 493 N.W.2d at 649) (stating that if "live-in" companions wish to share
their property they should express the intention in writing).
691. Id. 914, 569 N.W.2d at 285.
692. Id. 9 17, 569 N.W.2d at 286.
693. Id. 9 18.
694. Id. (citing Wheeler v. Wheeler, 548 N.W.2d at 27, 30 (N.D. 1996)).
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regarding cohabitation in the divorce decree demonstrates that Loretta's
cohabitation was not unforeseen at the time. 695
Duane also alleged that, because Loretta is sharing expenses in her
"live-in" relationship, she has decreased financial needs. 696 Duane
asserts that this decrease justifies a reduction in his support payments. 697
The court found that Duane's assertion assumes that decreased need
automatically results from cohabitation. 698 The court rejects such an as-
sertion, stating that evidence of decreased financial need must be shown
by Duane before a reduction could be given.699 The court concluded by
upholding the lower court's denial of Loretta's claim for attorney's fees
and costs. 700 A party seeking attorney's fees must demonstrate need,
and the other party's ability to pay. 701 Loretta's sole demonstration of
need was the assertion that Duane earned more money than her, and
always would. 702 The court rejected this statement as insufficient to
demonstrate need. 703 Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's
determination that each party should pay their own attorney's fees. 704
INSURANCE-PUBLIC POLICY
MARTIN V. ALLIANZ LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA
In Martin v. Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America, 7
0 5
Donald Martin appealed the district court's granting of Allianz's Motion
for summary judgment. 706 On October 5, 1995, Donald Martin had
been injured in a motor vehicle collision in Tennessee. 707 As a result of
the accident, Martin experienced a severe fracture dislocation of his
lower left leg.708 Although the injury to Martin's leg was serious, it was
believed that Martin had a chance at salvaging the limb. 709 At the end of
October, Martin was transported to the Dakota Heartland Hospital in
Fargo, North Dakota.7 10 The hospital released Martin in mid-January. 7 i
695. See id.
696. See id. 19.
697. Id.
698. Id.
699. Id. (citing Myhre v. Myhre, 296 N.W.2d 905, 909 (S.D. 1980)) (stating that decreased need
does not automatically occur when a person cohabits).
700. Id. 20, 569 N.W.2d at 286-87.
701. Id., 569 N.W.2d at 286 (citing Lill v. Lill, 520 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1994)).
702. Id., 569 N.W.2d at 286-87.
703. Id., 569 N.W.2d at 287.
704. Id.
705. 1998 N.D. 8, 573 N.W.2d 823.
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The viability of Martin's lower leg had been a question throughout
his rehabilitation, and on April 18, 1996, Martin's lower left leg was
amputated. 7 12 The amputation occurred 196 days after the initial injury
occurred. 7 13
After the amputation, Martin filed a claim for accidental disability
benefits with Allianz. 7 1 4 Martin owned an Accidental Death and Dismem-
berment Insurance policy that he had purchased through the American
Legion. 7 15 As part of the policy coverage, the insured could recover for
loss of a limb. 7 16 However, according to the insurance policy, the
covered loss had to occur within ninety days after the injury was sus-
tained. 717 Allianz subsequently denied Martin's claim because the ampu-
tation of Martin's leg did not occur within the required ninety day
period stated in the policy. 718 Martin filed suit against Allianz claiming
breach of contract and bad faith.719
The district court denied Martin's claim and awarded summary
judgment to Allianz. 720 Martin appealed the district court's decision to
the North Dakota Supreme Court.72 1 On appeal, the North Dakota
Supreme Court considered two issues raised by Martin. 722 The court
considered whether the word "severance" in the insurance contract was
ambiguous and could include "functional severance," and whether the
ninety day limitation period in the contract violated public policy.723 In
interpreting an insurance contract, the court first looks at the plain
language of the contract. 724 If the court finds that the policy is clear on
its face, no construction can be made. 725 When an important term in the
contract is undefined, the court applies the plain, ordinary meaning of
the term.726 The court stated that although it prefers resolving ambigui-
ties in the contract in favor of the insured, it will not strain the definition
of a word in order to provide coverage. 727 In looking at the contract in
Martin's case, the court found that the word "severance" was not ambig-
712. Id. U 3-4.
713. Id. 4.
714. Id. 6, 573 N.W.2d at 825.
715. Id. 5, 573 N.W.2d at 824.








724. Id. 9 (citing Sellie v. North Dakota Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 494 N.W.2d 151, 156 (N.D. 1992)).
725. Id. (citing Sellie, 494 N.W.2d at 156).
726. Id. (citing Sellie, 494 N.W.2d at 156-57).
727. Id. (citing Kief Farmers Co-op. Elevator v. Farmland, 534 N.W.2d 28, 32 (N.D. 1995));
Link v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 897, 900 (N.D. 1986).
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UOUS. 728 Martin claimed that "severance" was, ambiguous because the
term could mean "physical severance" or "functional severance." 729
The court stated that neither the words "physical" nor "functional"
appeared in the contract and the words did not add anything, but would
instead modify the contract term. 730 The court stated that it would not
add the words in order to create an ambiguity where one did not exist
before. 731 The court found that the meaning of the term "severance,"
by itself, was when a member is separated or taken apart from the rest of
the body.732 Therefore, "functional severance" was not in the plain
meaning of the term, and is not included in the policy coverage. 733
Most courts agree that the term "severance" is unambiguous. 734
As additional support for its interpretation of the term, the court found
that because the policy was titled "Death and Dismemberment" it would
be inconsistent for the term "severance" to. be broader than the main
title of the policy. 735 After determining that the district court had been
correct in granting summary judgment because Martin's leg was not
"severed" within the ninety day period, the court then turned to whether
the ninety day limitation violated public policy. 736 Martin argued that
the ninety day limitation period violates public policy by forcing a
person to choose between losing a limb that has the potential to be saved
or taking the insurance proceeds. 737 The court rejected Martin's argu-
ment, noting that such limitation periods are generally upheld. 738 The
court stated that the test of whether a provision violates public policy is
not whether it creates a hardship to the plaintiff, but whether the pro-
vision is so unreasonable that it must be held contrary to the public
interest. 739
In addition, when a court is faced with deciding if public policy has
been violated, it must consider the right of individuals to enter into a con-
tract. 740 The court concluded that the ninety day limitation period was
not so unreasonable as to violate the public interest of North Dakota. 74 1
728. See id. 10-17, 573 N.W.2d at 825-27.
729. Id. 1 10, 573 N.W.2d at 825.
730. Id. 1 I1, 573 N.W.2d at 826.
731. Id.
732. Id. 12.
733. See id. 12-13.
734. Id. [ 13 (citing Travelers Ins. v. Burchett, 841 F.2d 155, 157 (6th Cir. 1988)).
735. Id. 15, 573 N.W.2d at 827.
736. Id. 1 17-18.
737. Id. 1 18.
738. Id. (citing Hawes v. Kansas Farm Bureau, 710 P.2d 1312, 1316-17 (Kan. 1985)).
739. Id. 7 19, 573 N.W.2d at 528 (citing Comelier v. American Casualty Co., 389 F.2d 642, 644
(2d Cir. 1968)).
740. Id. at 20 (citing Johnson v. Peterbilt of Fargo, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 162, 164 (N.D. 1989)).
741. Id. 121.
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The court noted that while the limitation period may appear to offer the
gruesome choice of collecting proceeds or keeping a limb, the actual
purpose of such insurance is to provide coverage in such extreme
situations. 7 42 The court felt that while the ninety day limitation may
appear arbitrary, a court designated number would be just as arbitrary.
74 3
Therefore, if policy holders desire a longer limitation period, the
competitive insurance market is better positioned to extend the period.
74 4
Since there was a reasonable basis for denying Martin's claim, and the
policy limitation did not violate public policy, the court did not find bad
faith.745 The court subsequently affirmed the district court's decision.
746
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO)-
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
BURR V. KULAS
In Burr v. Kulas,7 4 7 Joyce Burr appealed from the trial court's
summary judgment that dismissed her action based on a three-year
statute of limitations.7 4 8 Joyce Burr was a graduate student at the Uni-
versity of North Dakota.7 49 She brought an action against University
officials alleging they conspired to steal a survey she created for her
doctoral thesis and held it out as their own work. 750 Burr also alleged
that the officials violated of the State Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) according to N.D.C.C. Chapter 12.1-06.1.751
The district court granted summary judgment against Burr and she
appealed. 7
52
In 1995, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of
Burr's claims against the University officials in their capacity as officers
of the school, but reversed and remanded for trial the personal claims
against the officials. 7 53 On remand, the district court granted summary
judgment against Burr based on the three-year statute of limitations.
7 54




745. Id. 25, 573 N.W.2d at 829.
746. Id. 27.
747. 1997 N.D. 98, 564 N.W.2d 631.
748. Burr v. Kulas, 1997 N.D. 98, 1,564 N.W.2d 631, 633.
749. Id. 2.
750. Id 6, 564 N.W.2d at 633-34.
751. Id. 16, 564 N.W.2d at 634.
752. Id.
753. Id. (referring to Burr v. Kulas, 532 N.W.2d 388 (N.D. 1995)).
754. Id. 7.
755. Id. 1 I, 564 N.W.2d at 633.
620 [VOL. 74:567
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
statute of limitations. North Dakota's RICO statute provides for a seven-
year statute of limitations. 756 However, the trial court followed N.D.C.C.
§ 28-01-22.1 which states, "[w]hen not otherwise specifically provided
by law, an action against the state or its employees and officials acting
within the scope of their employment or office must be commenced
within three years." 757 Thus, the trial court applied a three-year statute
of limitations. 758
First, the Court examined whether the officials' conduct was within
the scope of their employment. 759 When a state employee acts in a reck-
less, grossly negligent, or willful or wanton manner, the employee may
be personally liable. 760 Questions regarding knowledge, intent, negli-
gence, and state of mind are usually questions of fact.761 Summary judg-
ment is generally precluded when material, factual questions exist. 762
Next, the Court determined that the seven-year statute of limitations
applied because N.D.C.C. § 28-01-22.1 goes into effect only "when not
otherwise specifically provided by law." 763 The state's RICO statute
provided for a seven-year statute. 764 When there is a question in terms of
which statute of limitation applies, courts generally defer to the longer
statute of limitations. 765  Therefore, the trial court should not have
dismissed Burr's claims based on the expiration of the statute of
limitations. 766
Since this was a case of first impression, the court looked to the fed-
eral RICO statute and case law for guidance. 767 When North Dakota's
RICO statute was amended in 1995, it more closely resembled the federal
law. 768 North Dakota, like federal law, requires a "pattern of racketeer-
ing." 76 9 According to the United States Supreme Court, a "pattern of
racketeering" is established when there are two or more predicate acts
which relate to each other. 770 The predicate acts must demonstrate a
threat of continued racketeering activity, 77 1 which is a question of fact
756. Id. 9, 564 N.W.2d at 634.
757. Id.
758. Id.








767. Id. [ 14, 564 N.W.2d at 636.
768. Id. 9115.
769. Id.
770. Id. 9 16 (citing H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989)).
771. Id. (citing H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 240).
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and must be determined on a case by case basis. 772 Burr argued that the
officials' actions amounted to a pattern of racketeering. 773 However, to
establish a RICO claim, Burr must establish two predicate acts. 774 This is
a factual issue, 775 and the trial court should not have granted summary
judgment. 776 Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for trial.
777
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
BRAATEN v. DEERE & Co., INC.
In Braaten v. Deere & Co., Inc., 778 Barbara Braaten, as personal
representative for the estate of Arnold Boomgarden, appealed a district
court judgment dismissing her wrongful death action. 779 Braaten assert-
ed that although the statute of limitations for bringing her action had
expired on her action, the doctrine of equitable tolling should allow her
to file her claim. 780 The lower court disagreed, concluding that equitable
tolling may extend the state's two-year statute of limitations, but did not
apply in Braaten's case due to a lack of good faith on Braaten's part.7 81
Arnold Boomgarden was killed on May 10, 1993, while operating a
tractor manufactured by Deere & Company and owned by his brother,
George Boomgarden. 782 Braaten was appointed the personal represen-
tative of Boomgarden's estate, and on May 4, 1995, she filed a wrongful
death action against George Boomgarden and Deere & Company in
United States District Court.7 83 The filing of the action occurred six
days before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. 784 On
July 17, 1995, the federal district court dismissed Braaten's claim for
lack of diversity jurisdiction.785 The court concluded that the domicile
of the decedent, not Braaten, was dispositive and as such, the case lacked
diversity.7 86
On July 19, 1995, after being dismissed from federal court, Braaten
filed a wrongful death action in Stutsman County District Court. 787 The
772. Id. (citing H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 242).
773. Id. 17.
774. Id. 9118, 564 N.W.2d at 636-37.
775. Id.
776. Id. 19, 564 N.W.2d at 637.
777. Id.
778. 1997 N.D. 202, 569 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1997).
779. Braaten v. Deere & Co., Inc., 1997 N.D. 202, 1,569 N.W.2d at 563, 563.
780. Id. 5, 569 N.W.2d at 564.
781. Id. 1,569 N.W.2d at 563.
782. Id. 2, 569 N.W.2d at 564.
783. Id.
784. Id.
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filing of the state action occurred seventy days after the expiration of the
statute of limitations. 788 After Braaten filed the state action, both Defen-
dants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 789 Braaten
responded to the motion by arguing that although the state action had
been filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations, the doctrine of
equitable tolling should permit her to pursue her state action. 790 Initial-
ly, the district court agreed that equitable tolling should permit Braaten
to pursue her state claim because she had satisfied the established
three-part test requiring: 1) timely notice; 2) lack of prejudice; and 3)
reasonable, good faith conduct by the plaintiff.791
Subsequently, the district court certified two questions to the North
Dakota Supreme Court. 792 The district court's questions asked whether
the trial court has the authority to adopt the doctrine of equitable tolling,
and whether equitable tolling permits the filing of an action in state court
when commenced in federal court and later dismissed. 793 The North
Dakota Supreme Court declined to answer the questions because the
response would not wholly dispose of the case. 794 The district court
concluded that Braaten had not acted in good faith by initially filing in
federal court, reversing its previous order granting the defendants'
motion for summary judgment.795
On appeal, Braaten challenged the district court's determination that
she had not acted in good faith.796 In response, the defendants asserted
that even if Braaten had acted in good faith, the district court did not
have the authority to adopt the doctrine of equitable tolling. 797 The
court began its decision by stating that it did not need to decide whether
it was appropriate to adopt equitable tolling because the doctrine would
not apply in the present case.798 The sole issue considered by the court
was whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
Braaten had not acted in good faith by initially filing her action in
federal court.799 The court also looked at whether the district court





791. See id. (citing Burr v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 492 N.W.2d 904, 910 (N.D. 1992)).
792. See id. 6 (citing Braaten v. Deere & Co., Inc., 547 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1996)).
793. See id. (citing Braaten, 547 N.W.2d at 752).
794. Id. (citing Braaten, 547 N.W.2d at 752).
795. Id. 7.
796. Id. 8, 569 N.W.2d at 564-65.
797. See id.
798. Id.
799. Id. 7 9, 569 N.W.2d at 565.
800. Id.
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In its analysis'of the case, the court stated that a wrongful death
action is a right created by statute, and that the Legislature has the
authority to limit or eliminate the action. 80 1 Additionally, the Legislature
has the authority to enact statutes of limitation. 802 The court has stated
that it is not certain that it is appropriate for the court to adopt the
doctrine of equitable tolling as an exception to a statute of limitation
created by the state Legislature.803
If equitable tolling were to be applied, the court stated that all three
requirements of the doctrine must be met. 804 Therefore, the court deter-
mined that the district court was correct in finding that Braaten had
demonstrated bad faith in filing her action in federal court. 805 The court
stated that while the choice of forum alone does not imply a lack of
good faith, it does create an inference of forum shopping. 806. Braaten's
choice may not have been inherently wrong, but it did give the district
court the right to closely examine her decision. 807
In determining that Braaten's decision to file in federal court
showed bad faith, the court rejected her argument that she was merely
arguing a questionable issue of diversity jurisdiction. 808 The court
found it apparent that the federal court never had jurisdiction over
Braaten's claim. 809 Therefore, the court concluded that Braaten's filing
in federal court resulted from poor legal research and imprudent legal
practice. 810 The court stated that such conduct should not be reward-
ed. 811 The court also pointed out that Braaten had notice of the lack of
federal jurisdiction from the time the defendants answered her com-
plaint. 812 The court stated that once she became aware of the lack of
diversity, Braaten should have tried to protect her claim by immediately
filing an action in state court.8 l3
The court found that the fact Braaten did not act for over a month,
while waiting for a certain dismissal, showed a failure to act reason-
ably. 814 Waiting for "an inevitable ruling," while a statute of limitations
801. Id. I 11.
802. Id.
803. See id. 13 (citing Burr v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 492 N.W.2d 904, 910 (N.D. 1992)) (refusing to
apply the doctrine of equitable tolling in a medical malpractice action).
804. Id. 1 14, 569 N.W.2d at 566.
805. Id. 9119, 569 N.W.2d at 566-67.
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is "poised to terminate" an action "is unreasonable" behavior.815 The
court affirmed the district court's judgment, stating Braaten had failed to
act reasonably because she did not satisfy the elements for "equitable
tolling," and the court did not need to address "whether it is appropriate
for the district court to" apply equitable tolling on "an unambiguous
statute of limitations." 816
WORKERS' COMPENSATION-ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
MCCARTY V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU
In McCarty v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau,817 Jeff
McCarty appealed a district court judgment upholding the Bureau's dis-
missal of his claim for benefits. 818 McCarty initially filed a claim for
benefits with the Bureau in 1995.819 The Bureau dismissed McCarty's
claim, and after McCarty requested a rehearing, an administrative law
judge (ALJ) heard the case in March, 1996.820 After the hearing, the
ALJ concluded that McCarty had suffered a work-related injury, and
made a recommendation that the Bureau award McCarty benefits. 82'
The Bureau rejected the ALJ's recommendation, concluding that
McCarty had a history of back problems and the incident McCarty com-
plained of had not been a significant aggravation of his condition. 822
McCarty appealed the Bureau's order to the district court, and in
October of 1996, counsel for the Bureau offered to resolve the matter by
accepting the ALJ's decision.823
In December of 1996, the Bureau issued an order accepting the
ALJ's recommendation. 824 However, on the same day, the Bureau issued
a new order denying McCarty's claim because the Bureau claimed that
McCarty had made false-statements in connection with his claim. 825
McCarty appealed to the district court, and after the district court
affirmed the Bureau's decision, he appealed to the North Dakota
Supreme Court. 826
815. See id.
816. Id. 1 19, 569 N.W.2d at 566-67 (citing Erickson v. Croft, 760 P.2d 706, 709 (Mont. 1988)).
817. 1998 N.D. 9, 574 N.W.2d at 556.






823. Id. $ 5-6, 557 N.W.2d at 557-58.
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In looking at McCarty's case the court found that it had jurisdiction
to review the appeal. 827 The Bureau attempted to claim that McCarty
had not exhausted his administrative remedies by petitioning for a rehear-
ing of the false-statements dismissal before appealing the decision to the
district court, and ultimately to the North Dakota Supreme Court. 828
Relying on its decision in Lende v. North Dakota Workers' Compen-
sation Bureau,829 the court stated that when the Bureau issues a formal
decision, an appeal may be made directly to the district court without
first having to file a petition for rehearing. 830 Therefore, the court stated
that the Bureau's false-statement order was a final and appealable order
that the court can review. 831
In challenging the Bureau's false-statement order, McCarty asserted
that administrative res judicata prevented the Bureau from denying his
claim on the grounds that he made false statements in his claim. 832 Res
judicata bars relitigation of claims or issues that could have been raised
in prior actions between the same parties, where the prior action has been
resolved by a final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction. 833 If
the subsequent claims are based on a factual situation identical to the
claims in the prior proceeding, then they should have been raised in the
prior proceeding. 834 While res judicata is typically used in court
proceedings, it also applies to administrative agency decisions. 835
In looking at McCarty's case, the court noted that the only issue
raised by the Bureau in the original proceeding was whether McCarty's
claimed injury merely acted as a trigger to produce symptoms in a
pre-existing condition that would have manifested anyway. 836 The
false-statements issue was not raised until after the hearing, but before
the ALJ issued his decision, when the Bureau submitted an affidavit from
McCarty's former supervisor contradicting McCarty's testimony.837
The court found that the false-statement issue should have been deter-
mined in the prior proceeding in front of the ALJ.838 At that time, the
827. Id. 1 10, 557 N.W.2d at 559.
828. Id. 1 8-10, 557 N.W.2d at 558-59.
829. 1997 N.D. 178, 568 N.W.2d 755.
830. McCarty, 1998 ND 9, 10, 574 N.W.2d at 559.
831. Id.
832. Id. I1 l.
833. Id. 1 12 (citing Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 383 (N.D.
1992)).
834. Id. 13 (quoting Littlefield v. Union State Bank, 500 N.W.2d 881, 884 (N.D. 1993)).
835. Id. 14 (citing Cridland v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 1997 N.D. 223,
22, 571 N.W.2d 351, 356).
836. See id. 15, 557 N.W.2d at 560.
837. Id. IT 15, 16, 557 N.W.2d at 559-60.
838. Id. 9119, 557 N.W.2d at 561.
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Bureau had a "full and fair opportunity" to present the issue. 839 Absent
new evidence, the Bureau could not reconsider the false-statements issue
after it had adopted the AL's recommendation. 840 Therefore, the doc-
trine of administrative res judicata applied to the Bureau's decision to
adopt the AL's recommendations. 841 The court then reversed the dis-
trict court's judgment, and directed the Bureau to award McCarty bene-
fits in accordance with the adoption of the AL's recommendations. 842
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW-AGENCY PROCEDURE
LENDE V. WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU
In Lende v. Workers' Compensation Bureau8 4 3 the issue before the
court was whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal on
an order from the Bureau. 844 Sharon Lende appealed a district court
judgment dismissing her appeal from a Workers' Compensation Order
issued on the Bureau. 845 Lende suffered a work-related back injury on
October 2, 1988.846 The Workers' Compensation Bureau accepted lia-
bility for Lende's injury and paid her benefits. 847 Lende was given treat-
ment for her injury, and she eventually returned to work in a modified
position. 848
After returning to work, Lende's pain began to increase, and she
could no longer work. 849 Lende was diagnosed as being permanently
partially disabled, and she could not work at any level. 850 On September
28, 1994, Lende's physician wrote a letter to the Workers' Compen-
sation Bureau concluding that Lende was sixty percent impaired due to
chronic pain from her injury. 851 Lende's attorney sent a letter to the
Bureau requesting that it issue a permanent partial impairment award
(PPI) based on the physician's evaluation.
Lende received no response from the Bureau with regards to her
request, and sent another letter to the bureau, on March 30, 1995.852
After failing to receive any response from the Bureau, she filed for a writ
839. Id. (citing Lamplighter Lounge, Inc. v. State ex rel. Heitkamp, 510 N.W.2d 585, 590 (N.D.
1994)).
840. See id. 20.
841. See id.
842. Id. 21.
843. 1997 N.D. 178, 1 568 N.W.2d at 755, 758.
844. Lende v. Workers' Compensation Bureau, 1997 N.D. 178, 910, 568 N.W.2d at 755, 758.
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of mandamus in the district court on April 28, 1995, in order to direct
the Bureau to issue the PPI order. 853 The Bureau was served with notice
of the action, and on May 2, 1995, the Bureau issued an order denying
Lende's PPI award. 854 The following day Lende petitioned the Bureau
to reconsider its order. 855 On May 9, 1995 the Bureau contacted
Lende's attorney in an attempt to select another physician to evaluate
Lende and resolve the dispute. 856 Attempts to select another physician
proved unsuccessful, and on September 1, 1995 Lende's attorney con-
tacted the Bureau and suggested that they accept the recommendation of
Lende's treating physician. 857 After receiving no response, Lende's
attorney wrote to the Bureau on September 25, 1995 asking whether the
Bureau would issue Lende's PPI award. 858
On October 30, 1995, Lende's attorney was contacted by outside
counsel retained by the Bureau to handle the matter. 859 The outside
counsel informed Lende's attorney that a hearing would be scheduled in
order to resolve the matter. 860 From November until late December,
Lende's attorney made several requests to the outside counsel that the
Bureau set a hearing date. 86 1 These requests were not answered. 862
Finally, on December 26, 1995, Lende's attorney wrote directly to the
Bureau stating that if a hearing date was not set, he would petition the
court for a writ of mandamus on the matter. 863 Still, no response came
from the Bureau, and on January 11, 1996, Lende filed an appeal of the
Bureau's May 2, 1995, order in district court. 864
Section 28-32-15(3)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code grants
district courts appellate jurisdiction over administrative agency orders. 865
However, a person appealing an administrative order must show the
finality and appealability of an order. 866 The Bureau responded by
claiming that Lende's appeal was premature because no final order had






858. Id. 7 7, 568 N.W.2d at 757-58.
859. Id.
860. Id.




865. See id. 10.
866. See id. I I (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-14 (1995)).
867. Id. 1 9.
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the order for lack of jurisdiction, and Lende appealed the dismissal to
the North Dakota Supreme Court.868
On review, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that on
May 2, 1995, the Bureau had issued a final order that was appealable. 869
The May 2, 1995, order was a formal decision by the Bureau, and Lende
had petitioned for reconsideration after the order was issued. 870 The
court stated that according to Section 28-32-14(3) of the North Dakota
Century Code, a person may petition for reconsideration of an admini-
strative order, and if the agency does not dispose of the petition within
thirty days, the petition is denied. 871 The court rejected the Bureau's
contention that it had not yet disposed of Lende's petition for reconsider-
ation because it was still pending before the Bureau, and that Lende's
administrative remedies were not yet exhausted. 872 The court stated that
the Bureau had disposed of Lende's petition because, at a minimum, the
Bureau must take some affirmative action to arrange a formal hearing
within thirty days of receipt of the petition, and no such action had been
taken in this case.873
The court recognized that it is not always possible for the Bureau to
schedule and hold a hearing within thirty days of filing a petition for
reconsideration. 874 However, the plain meaning of the words "dispose
of" requires some affirmative action by the Bureau in furtherance of
arranging a formal hearing. 875 The court stated that since it was undis-
puted that the Bureau took no action within thirty days of the filing of
the petition for reconsideration, and the Bureau did not even acknowl-
edge the petition several months after it was filed, the Bureau's order of
May 2, 1995, became a final order thirty days after the petition was
filed.876
While it is usually required that a party exhaust all administrative
remedies before an appeal can be made to the district court, in the pre-
sent case, the court found that once her petition had been disposed of by
the Bureau, Lende could appeal. 877 Therefore, exhaustion of all other
administrative remedies was not required in this case. 878 The court
868. See id.
869. Id. 22, 568 N.W.2d at 760.
870. Id. 1 14, 568 N.W.2d at 759.
871. Id. 20.
872. See id. 23, 568 N.W.2d at 760.
873. Id. 20, 568 N.W.2d at 759-60.
874. Id. 2 22, 568 N.W.2d at 760.
875. Id.
876. Id.
877. See id. 24 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-14(4), -15(l)), (finding that North Dakota
administrative agency law permitted an appeal of the Bureau's order after the Bureau failed to
dispose of the petition for reconsideration in 30 days).
878. Id. 24 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-14(1)) (requiring exhaustion of all administrative
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further explained that Lende need not have exhausted her administrative
remedies because the Bureau had been unreasonable in its delay. 879
Administrative sluggishness can understandably prompt direct appeals to
the district court. 880  The court noted that the Bureau's delay was
unreasonable, and the Bureau lacked any good and valid reason for such
delay.88 1
In spite of the delay in handling Lende's claim, the Bureau main-
tained that Lende failed to make a timely appeal of the order to the dis-
trict court.882 An appeal of a final order made by the Bureau ordinarily
must be filed within thirty days after notice of the final determination
has been given to the party. 883 The court rejected the Bureau's argu-
ment in the present case because Lende never received actual notice
from the Bureau of the final determination, and therefore the thirty day
appeals period never began to run. 884 In addition, the court noted that
the applicable statute does not specify when the thirty day period begins
to run in situations where an agency has not disposed of a petition for
reconsideration within thirty days. 885
Since the statute did not cover such a situation, the court looked to
the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. 886 The court found that the
rules of civil procedure also state that the time for appeal does not start
until notice of the entry of judgment is served. 887 The court determined
that the requirement of giving notice before the time for appeals begins
running, harmonized the requirements under Section 28-32-15, and the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. 888 To find otherwise, the court
stated, would be to "let petitions for reconsideration drop into a 'black
hole' from which such claims would never emerge." 889
The court subsequently reversed the lower court's decision, and
remanded the case to district court for a decision on the merits. 890 In a
brief concurrence, Chief Justice VandeWalle stated that while he did not
agree that notice was a requirement under the North Dakota Rules of
Civil Procedure 77(d) because of Section 28-32-15(1), the Bureau's
remedies before an appeal of an order can be made to district court).
879. Id. 26, 568 N.W.2d at 761.
880. Id. 25 (citing In re Claim of Olson, 419 N.W.2d 894, 896 (N.D. 1988)).
881. Id. 9 27.
882. See id. T 28, 568 N.W.2d at 761-62.
883. Id. (citing N.D. CEN'T. CODE § 28-32-15 (N.D. 1988)).
884. Id. 32, 568 N.W.2d at 762.
885. Id. 9 30 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-15) (stating that the statute provides for the 30
days to run after notice has been served upon the party).




890. Id. 9 35, 568 N.W.2d at 763.
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delay was inexcusable and unexplainable, which justified the court's
decision. 891
WORKERS' COMPENSATION-DEFINING PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT
MCCABE V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU
In McCabe v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau,892
Kevin McCabe appealed a district court judgment which affirmed an
order of the Workers' Compensation Bureau which denied his claim for
additional permanent partial impairment [PPI] benefits. 893 In 1988,
McCabe injured his back and neck at work. 894 The Workers' Compen-
sation Bureau accepted his claim and paid benefits. 895 In 1994, McCabe
reached his maximum medical recovery. 896 Dr. Blair Bauer did a PPI
evaluation according to the American Association Guides [Guides] using
the Range of Motion Model [ROM Model].8 97 Dr. Bauer concluded that
McCabe suffered a twenty percent whole-body impairment. 898 The
Bureau's Medical Director disagreed with the use of the ROM Model
and advised that McCabe should have been evaluated using the Diagno-
sis Related Estimates Model [DRE Model], a more recent model from the
Guides. 899 The DRE Model evaluated McCabe at a ten percent impair-
ment. 900 The Bureau awarded McCabe PPI benefits for a ten percent im-
pairment. 901 McCabe appealed. 90 2 The district court affirmed the order
and McCabe again appealed. 90 3
The appropriate version of the Guides used to evaluate McCabe's
impairment was unclear.90 4 When McCabe was evaluated in 1994, the
relevant statutes had been enacted in 1989.905 The relevant statutes were
N.D.C.C. §§ 65-05-12 and 65-01-02(26).906 N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12
stated: "Any rating of the percentage of functional impairment should
be in accordance with the standards for the evaluation of permanent
891. Id. [38.
892. 1997 N.D. 145, 567 N.W.2d 201.
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impairment as published in the most recent edition of the American
Medical Association's "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impair-
ment." 907 N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(26) determines "Permanent Impair-
ment" loss based upon "the most current edition of the American
Medical Association's "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impair-
ment." 908 Neither statute clarifies whether the "most recent" or "most
current" Guides were based on when the statute was enacted or when the
patient is evaluated. 909
The Bureau argued that the DRE Model from the 1993 edition of
the Guides was the "most recent" and the "most current." 910 McCabe
argued that the ROM Model from the Guides must be used because it
was the "most recent" and the "most current" Guides when the statute
was enacted in 1989.911 In State v. Julson,912 the court noted that when a
statute has two constructions, one constitutional and one unconstitutional,
the court must adopt -the constitutional interpretation of the statute. 913
The court analyzed the conflicting interpretations of the statutes in
McCabe and found that a statute that attempts to incorporate future
changes of a guideline is unconstitutional. 9 14 Therefore, the "most
recent" and "most current" edition of the Guides was the Guides in
existence at the time of the statutes' enactment. 915
The court interpreted the statutes to direct the use of the ROM
Model, which was in effect at the enactment of the statutes, in order to
evaluate McCabe's percentage of impairment. 916 Since the Bureau never
challenged the accuracy of Dr. Bauer's opinion using the ROM Model,
the court found that McCabe suffered a twenty percent whole-body im-
pairment.9 17 The court reversed and remanded for an entry of judgment
directing the Bureau to award McCabe additional PPI benefits based on a




910. Id. 9, 567 N.W.2d at 203-04.
911. Id. 99, 567 N.W.2d at 204.
912. 202 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1972).
913. McCabe, 1997 N.D. 145, 9111, 567 N.W.2d at 204 (referring to State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d
145 (N.D. 1972)).
914. Id.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-EXCLUSIVITY OF REMEDY
ZIMMERMAN BY ZIMMERMAN V. VALDAK CORPORATION
In Zimmerman by Zimmerman v. Valdak Corporation,919 the Plain-
tiff, Joshua Zimmerman, appealed a district court judgment dismissing
his action against his employer. 920 Zimmerman had been injured while
working at the Valley Dairy Car Wash in Grand Forks, North Dakota.92 1
On November 7, 1992, Zimmerman was reaching into a laundry
machine used to spin dry towels when the machine tore his right arm
from his body. 922 Zimmerman was fifteen years old at the time of the
injury.923
The machine that injured Zimmerman ordinarily had an interlock
system that prevented the lid from being opened until the drum had
stopped spinning. 924 At the time of the accident, the interlock system
had not been functioning properly for several months, and Zimmerman
and other employees were opening the lid and removing towels while the
machine's drum was still spinning. 925 The North Dakota Workers' Com-
pensation Bureau accepted liability for the injury and paid for Zimmer-
man's medical expenses. 926 However, "the Bureau denied disability and
vocational rehabilitation benefits." 927 The Bureau determined that Zim-
merman "had not sustained a catastrophic injury" and that he could still
"earn wages equal to his pre-injury wages." 928
In 1995, Zimmerman's parents brought an action on behalf of
Zimmerman against Valdak, Zimmerman's employer.929 On May 15,
1995, the district court granted Valdak's motion for summary judgment
"based on the 'exclusive remedy' provision of the North Dakota Wor-
kers' Compensation Act." 930 Zimmerman appealed the district court's
dismissal to the North Dakota Supreme Court. 93 1 Zimmerman claimed
that the exclusive remedy provision should not apply when the
employee's injury resulted from an intentional tort. 932
919. 1997 N.D. 203, 570 N.W.2d 204.
920. Zimmerman by Zimmerman v. Valdak Corporation, 1997 N.D. 203, 570 N.W.2d 204, 205.
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The court began its analysis of the case by stating that when em-
ployees are covered by Workers' Compensation, they forego their right
to sue their employer "in exchange for the employer's agreement to
cover" employees' injuries. 933 As long as the employer contributes to
the Workers' Compensation Fund, the employee has no right of action
against the employer for damages for personal injuries. 934 In spite of
the exclusivity provision, the court addressed the question of "whether
the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act bars a civil remedy for an
intentional tort." 935 The court also determined what constituted an
intentional tort if the Act did not bar such suits. 936
In addressing Zimmerman's claim, the court noted that most states
do not bar suits alleging intentional torts regardless of an exclusive rem-
edy provisions in their Workers' Compensation Acts. 937 The rationale
for adopting an intentional tort exception is that workers' compensation
laws are based on accidental injuries, not intentional acts. 938  Looking at
the rationale of other states and strong public policy considerations, the
court concluded that it was appropriate for North Dakota to adopt the
intentional tort cause of action against employers. 939 The court main-
tained that permitting such actions promotes a safe working en-
vironment. 940 Allowing intentional tort actions against employers also
prevents a scenario where an employer would be given immunity for
intentionally harming an employee. 941
After determining that adopting an intentional tort exception to the
workers' compensation act was appropriate, the court then turned to the
question of determining the standard for such an action. 942 The court
looked at several alternative tests for an "intentional tort" in the particu-
lar context of an employer's conduct in an attempt to find a test that
conformed to the intent of the North Dakota workers' compensation
policy. 943 Ultimately, the court determined that the "true intentional
933. Id. 8, 570 N.W.2d at 205-06.
934. See id.
935. Id. 10, 570 N.W.2d at 206.
936. Id.
937. Id. 911, 570 N.W.2d at 206-07.
938. Id. 12, 570 N.W.2d at 207.
939. See id. 15, 20, 21, 570 N.W.2d at 207-09.
940. Id., 570 N.W.2d at 207.
941. See id. (stating that if such actions were not permitted an employer would be able to "buy
the right to hit an employee") (citing Sitzman v. Schumaker, 718 P.2d 657, 659 (Mont. 1986)).
942. Id. 91 17, 570 N.W.2d at 208.
943. See id. 91 19, 20, 570 N.W.2d at 208-09 (looking at the test for intentional torts in various
states). The court noted that West Virginia, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, Michigan, South Dakota,
Texas, New Jersey, and Louisiana use a substantial certainty test to determine if an employer
committed an intentional tort. Id. 1 19. The court also noted that Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and the District of Columbia permit an action only if the employer
intended the act and intended for an injury to occur, which is also known as the "true intentional tort"
[VOL. 74:567
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
tort" standard was the appropriate standard to adopt. 944 Therefore, in
order for an employee to bring an intentional tort action against an em-
ployer, the employer must have "had knowledge an injury was certain to
occur" and must have "willfully disregarded that knowledge." 945
After settling on an appropriate test for determining when an
employer has committed an intentional tort, the court then examined
Zimmerman's allegations. 946
The court concluded that Zimmerman had failed to allege sufficient
facts to state a claim under the test. 947 Zimmerman demonstrated that
Valdak knew of the defective machine and failed to repair it, which
constituted a willful violation of safety provisions. 948 However, Valdak
did demonstrate that the machine had warning labels, and that they had
warned employees of the danger of putting arms in the machine while it
was still spinning. 949 Valdak also argued that no one else had been in-
jured using the machine. 950 Therefore, the court concluded that insuf-
ficient evidence existed to support a claim that Valdak had knowledge
that an injury was certain to occur from failing to repair the machine. 95 1
Since Zimmerman did not satisfy the test for a true intentional injury, the
court affirmed the district court's finding of summary judgment for the
Defendant. 952
Justice Neumann wrote a dissenting opinion in this case, finding an
inconsistency in the court's decision. 953 Justice Neumann stated that the
court's definition of the "true intentional tort" test was inconsistent, and
actually more closely resembled a strict version of the "substantial cer-
tainty" test that the court had rejected. 954 Justice Neumann stated that a
"true intentional tort" test requires an employer to have intended the
consequences of the action.955 Justice Neumann also argued that he be-
lieved that Zimmerman had alleged sufficient facts to withstand a sum-
mary judgment. 956 He stated that Zimmerman's proof that Valdak had
willfully violated safety provisions, and that the knowledge by Valdak
that an injury could occur from the machine should have been sufficient
standard. Id. 20, 570 N.W.2d at 208.





949. Id. 123, 570 N.W.2d at 209-10.
950. Id.
951. Id. 126.
952. Id. IT9 27, 28.
953. Id. [31.
954. Id. 9 32.
955. Id. 91 33, 570 N.W.2d at 210-11 (citing Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466,
471 (N.D. 1978)).
956. Id. 91 37, 570 N.W.2d at 211.
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to withstand summary judgment. 957 Therefore, Justice Neumann con-
cluded that in construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, a material question of fact did exist, and the case
should be reversed and remanded.
958
957. See id. 1 37, 39.
958. Id. 140.
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